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ARTICLE
Ross Fischer | Jack Gullahorn
The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations and the
Legal and Ethical Considerations for Attorneys
Abstract. Advocacy is the primary goal and responsibility of two distinct
and well-regulated professions: the lawyer and the lobbyist, each of whom is
subject to his own set of rules and regulations. This Article is designed to
analyze the intersection of the lawyer’s Disciplinary Code with developing
rules governing advocacy in the policy-making arenas throughout Texas.
Increasingly, the line between legal and legislative advocacy has become
blurred as more local Texas entities turn to state lobby regulations for
inspiration. This Article will consider the state Lobby Law, including its
history and structure, as a framework for subsequent efforts to regulate
lobbying and will identify the common elements of lobby regulation systems,
with a particular focus on their treatment of attorneys. It will also analyze
how, at every level in Texas, the rules of engagement regarding
communication and advocacy are being imposed with varying and significant
consequences for attorneys, with a particular emphasis on how local
governmental entities are literally rewriting those rules of engagement.
Finally, this Article will analyze the potential consequences for all who
advocate before governmental entities and attempt to influence public
servants, including criminal and ethical issues, with a particular focus on
attorneys engaged in lobbying. As local lobby regulations become more
common, attorneys dealing with local governments will be forced to examine
the fundamental aspects of the legal practice, including the structure of the
representation, the nature of advocacy and communication, and the meaning
of confidentiality.
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“Those who do not use local guides cannot take advantage of the ground.”
Sun Tzu, The Art of War1
I. INTRODUCTION
The world is shaped primarily by decisions made by us or for us in
almost every aspect of our lives. These decisions, made through the
process of advocacy, influence both the mundane and routine parts of our
daily lives and impart a critical and long-term impact on life itself.
The professional world of governmental advocacy is a major player in
the realm of decision-making. Given the importance of such decisions, it
is not surprising that citizens seek to influence them. This Article focuses
on legal intricacies regarding lobbying, or communicating to influence
decisions. Lobbying exists at every level of government and has influenced
1. SUN TZU, THE ART OF WAR 167 (Thomas Cleary, trans., Shambhala Publ’ns, Inc. 2000)
(c. 2 B.C.E.).
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the legislative branch throughout history.2 Regulation differs significantly
by venue, from the highly regulated and transparent to a complete lack of
structured regulation. In Texas, the regulation of lobbyists at the state
level evolved from an outright prohibition with criminal penalties to a
well-regulated system of registration, reporting, administrative rules, and
interpretive guidance (although some violations still carry criminal
penalties).
Traditional legal work in which licensed professionals are paid to advise,
strategize, interpret, and advocate is subject to specific rules and
regulations. In a legislative setting, however, those same behaviors have
historically been forbidden, and more recently regulated with an emphasis
on disclosure. The behaviors that come naturally to the advocate trained
in the law have transitioned from being strictly prohibited to being the
subject of mandatory disclosure when the advocate is acting as a lobbyist.
Increasingly, more local governments—mostly municipalities—are
adopting local ethics regulations to govern the conduct of officers,
employees, and those seeking to do business with local governments.
These regulations, which have historically focused on the conduct of
elected and appointed officials, are expanding to include local lobbying
regulations. The local rules include standards for determining who
qualifies as a local lobbyist, registration requirements, mandatory periodic
reporting, and limitations on behavior intended to influence decision
makers. Throughout Texas, local governmental entities are literally
rewriting the rules of engagement regarding communication and advocacy
with varying and significant consequences for attorneys.
It is difficult to discern how, if at all, the evolution of state-level lobby
regulations, and the advent of lobby rules at the local level, were influenced
by the ethical standards imposed upon the legal profession. Lawyers have
long been subject to rules designed to ensure the integrity of the legal
profession. These standards, currently codified in the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct, address many of the same concepts as
lobbying rules.
This Article is designed to analyze the intersection of the lawyer’s
Disciplinary Code with developing rules governing advocacy in the policymaking arenas throughout Texas. It will consider the state Lobby Law—
including its history and structure—as a framework for subsequent efforts
2. See Peter Grier, The Lobbyist Through History: Villainy and Virtue, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2009/0928/the-lobbyistthrough-history-villainy-and-virtue (“Congress has always had, and always will have, lobbyists and
lobbying.” (quoting Senator Byrd (D) of West Virginia during a 1987 floor speech)).
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to regulate lobbying. The common elements of lobby regulation systems
will be identified, with a particular focus on the impact on lawyer–
lobbyists. Finally, this Article will analyze the consequences, both criminal
and ethical, affecting those who advocate before governmental entities and
attempt to influence public servants, with an emphasis on attorneys
engaged in lobbying. As a result of expanding local lobby regulations,
attorneys involved with local governments reexamine fundamental aspects
of the legal practice, such as the structure of representation, the nature of
advocacy and communication, and the meaning of confidentiality.
II. THE REGULATION OF LOBBYISTS BY THE STATE OF TEXAS
Today in Texas, lobbying the legislature is a well-regulated profession.
This was not always the case. In the early 1900s, lobbying was a crime:
That if any paid or employed agent, representative or attorney of any person,
association or corporation, shall, at any place in this state, after the election
and during the term of office of any member of the Legislature of this state,
privately solicit the vote, or privately endeavor to exercise any influence, or
offer anything of value or any other inducements whatever, to any such
member of the Legislature, to influence his action concerning any measure
then pending or thereafter to be introduced, in either branch of the
Legislature of this State, he shall be deemed guilty of lobbying.3

A person convicted of lobbying faced a “fine of not less than two hundred
dollars nor more than two thousand dollars” and imprisonment between
six months and two years.4
This lobbying prohibition was central to some noteworthy Texas
contract cases of the early twentieth century. In Graves & Houtchens v.
Diamond Hill Independent School District,5 decided in 1922, a Texas
appellate court cited this penal provision, among a litany of persuasive
authorities from across the country, to nullify a contract for lobby
services.6 The Diamond Hill Independent School District retained Graves
& Houtchens to advocate for the defeat of pending legislation, the passage
of which would have hindered the district’s taxing authority.7 The firm
3. Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 79, § 2, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws 162,
163, repealed by Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, 1957 Tex. Gen.
Laws 17.
4. Id. § 4.
5. Graves & Houtchens v. Diamond Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 243 S.W. 638 (Tex. Civ. App.—
Fort Worth 1922, no writ).
6. Id. at 639–40.
7. Id. at 638 (claiming the passage of a proposed bill would diminish the school district’s taxing
ability).
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entreated lawmakers to kill the legislation on a contingent fee basis, taking
credit for its ultimate demise.8 However, when the district refused to pay
the agreed sum of $890, the firm sued the district.9 In reviewing the
matter, the court held that a contract to influence privately the outcome of
legislation was void as a matter of law and public policy.10 Among the
many authorities cited by the court was Williston on Contracts, opining,
“[A]n agreement by a legislator to exercise his judgment in a particular way
is not binding at law. His promise, if without consideration, is not
binding for that reason, and if he bargains for consideration it is illegal.”11
Davis v. Texas Farm Bureau Cotton Association12 involved an attorney
(and former legislator) who was retained by an association to represent its
interests before the legislature.13 Initially paid $500 for two days of work,
the lawyer testified before committees regarding the bill his client was
interested in and provided committee members with requested
information.14 However, his stay in Austin and the scope of his advocacy
grew greater than originally envisioned, stretching to a twelve-day stay and
resulting in a contractual fee dispute.15 During the course of the
representation, the attorney conversed with many of his former colleagues
both socially and regarding the bill his client was interested in.16 The
attorney admitted that he dined with some of them, but adamantly denied
that he sought private meetings with them for the purpose of influencing
their votes; rather, he testified the exchanges were initiated by the
legislators and that he merely answered their questions.17 After the hired
advocate brought suit for his fees, the association alleged in its defense that
the attorney privately solicited the votes of legislators, which violated the

8. Id. (citing the firm’s claim that “had it not been for their influence and efforts, . . .
[lawmakers] would have voted favorably” for the bill).
9. Id.
10. Id. at 639.
11. 3 SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1727 (1920); see Davis v. Tex. Farm
Bureau Cotton Ass’n, 62 S.W.2d 90, 96 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933) (“Personal influence exerted over
the individual members of a Legislature will vitiate a contract, the consideration of which is the
procurement of legislative action. Such a contract should be held void though there is no actual
corruption in the particular case. Although the contract may not expressly provide for personal
solicitation it will be declared illegal if it appears that in carrying out the contract it is necessary to
resort to ‘lobbying’ . . . .”).
12. Davis v. Tex. Farm Bureau Cotton Ass’n, 62 S.W.2d 90 (Tex. Comm’n App. 1933).
13. Id. at 91.
14. Id. at 92–93.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 94.
17. Id.
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criminal prohibition on lobbying.18
In its decision, the court found that even an appeal to a legislator’s
reason, if made privately by a paid agent, falls within the purview of the
statute.19 “Whenever any such paid or employed representative goes
beyond the limitations of the statute and singles out individual legislators,
privately, and either by argument or otherwise endeavors to influence their
action, he transgresses the law, however fair in intent he may be.”20 The
court ruled that personal influence exerted over individual legislators
violated the lobby law, thereby vitiating a contract for otherwise lawful
advocacy.21 The court’s holding clarified that mal-intent was not required
on the part of the lobbyist; rather, it held the contract was unenforceable
because of its “tendency to be injurious to the public.”22
The penalty for violation of the lobbying prohibition was substantial—a
monetary fine of $200 to $2,000 and possible jail time of six months to
two years—but there is no record of it ever being enforced.23 Indeed, the
two reported cases both dealt with civil suits filed by the lobbyist to
enforce payment of their fees.24
The first significant change in the regulatory scheme governing lobbying
occurred in 1937 when the Texas House adopted rules requiring persons
testifying before house committees to register and provide certain
information before testifying.25

18. Id. at 93–95 (summarizing parts of the defendant’s testimony containing allegations of
lobbying on behalf of the association by Mr. Davis).
19. Id. at 95. The Davis court first considered Article 179 of the lobbying statute and
concluded that while that particular provision permits persons with a direct interest in the pending
measure to attempt to influence the members of the legislature; however, that influence was limited
to appeals to reason. Id. It then considered Article 180, which applied to “paid agents,
representatives, and attorneys” and prohibited any attempt to influence legislators, including by
appeal to reason. Id.
20. Id. at 96.
21. Id. (“Although the contract may not expressly provide for personal solicitation it will be
declared illegal if it appears that in carrying out the contract it is necessary to resort to
‘lobbying’ . . . .”).
22. Id. at 97.
23. Cf. Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 79, § 4, 1907 Tex. Gen. Laws
162, 163 (providing a monetary fine and jail time for violation of lobbying statute) (repealed 1957).
24. See Davis, 62 S.W.2d at 91 (initiating suit to collect fees for lobbying services); Graves &
Houtchens v. Diamond Hill Indep. Sch. Dist., 243 S.W. 638, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.—Fort Worth
1922, no writ) (attempting to recover remaining balance on lobbying fees).
25. Tex. H.R. Rule 7 § 41, H.S.R. 9, 54th Leg., R.S., 1955 H.J. of Tex. 16, reprinted in Rules
of the House, Texas Legislative Manual 175–76 (1955).
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A. History
1. 1957
Although the adoption of the 1937 House Rules was significant, the real
precursor to the present day law on lobbying was the 1957 passage of the
Representation Before the Legislature Act (S.B. 2).26 This legislation
repealed all of the 1907 Penal Code provisions criminalizing the practice of
lobbying and replaced them with a registration statute that required those
who engage in “direct communications” to register with the Secretary of
State and report their clients as well as expenditures on lobbying efforts.27
However, the revision to the statutes did not completely broaden the
permissible activities of persons engaged in lobbying.
The definition of direct communication in S.B. 2 allowed not only
personal appearance before a legislative committee, but also the following:
[P]ersonal contact or communication with any member of the Legislature for
the purpose of explaining, discussing, or arguing for or against pending or
proposed legislation or any action thereon by the Legislature, the Governor
or the Lieutenant Governor during a session of the Legislature, to argue for
or against pending legislation or any action thereon by the Legislature, the
Governor, or the Lieutenant Governor.28

No longer were paid agents, representatives, or attorneys prohibited from
privately soliciting the vote of legislators or privately attempting to exercise
any influence over them.29 Additionally, the new law required lobbyists
to report expenditures and register with the state if those expenditures
exceeded fifty dollars.30
Offsetting this seemingly broad provision was the retention of the
26. Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws
17, repealed by Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, repealed by
Act of Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 479, § 224, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1652, 1719.
27. Id. § 3, 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 18.
28. Id. § 2(e), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 17.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 3(c), 1957 Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 18 (providing that a person with expenditures of more
than $50 must register and report such expenditures). While not reaching the level of regulation that
legislative contact reporting required, the 1957 legislation also initiated, for the first time, a
requirement that practitioners before state agencies sign a register at the state agency whenever they
contacted any state employee or official. Act of Dec. 2, 1957, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, § 2, 1957
Tex. Gen. Laws 30, 30 (requiring registration of “every person appearing before a state agency or
contacting in person any officer or employee thereof on behalf of any other person, firm, partnership,
corporation[,] or association”). This provision can now be found in similar form in Chapter 2004 of
the Texas Government Code, but without the central filing requirement. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
ch. 2004 (West 2008).
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limitation initially found in Article 179 of the early Penal Code that
prohibited influencing “the vote of any member of the Legislature or the
Lieutenant Governor or the approval or veto of the Governor on any
pending legislation other than by an appeal to reason.”31 Ostensibly, this
provision would still prohibit attempts to influence by means viewed as less
than direct.
2. 1973
Following the Sharpstown Scandal of 1971,32 which led to the
replacement of a majority of members of the legislature in the 1972
elections, the Legislature passed the Lobby Control Act (H.B. 2). Its
passage repealed the 1957 Representation Before the Legislature Act and
created the state’s first full lobby registration law.33 The Act required
registration with the secretary of state by persons compensated for or
making certain expenditures when communicating directly with the
legislative or executive branch to influence legislation.34 Considerably
pared down from its initial introduced version,35 the final bill retained
much of the registration framework that served as the basis for the current
law.36 Significantly, the “appeal to reason” language was excluded,
thereby eliminating the final barrier to private communications and
expenditures for non-substantive lobby contacts.37 In place of the
excluded language was a mechanism and requirement for reporting
expenditures and public disclosure of client information.38
31. Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, § 11, 1957 Tex. Gen.
Laws 17, 19 (emphasis added) (repealed 1973).
32. See Sam Kinch, Jr., Sharpstown Stock-Fraud Scandal, TEX. ST. HIST. ASS’N,
http://www.tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mqs01 (last visited May 9, 2013) (discussing the
infamous scandal involving state officials who made “profitable quick-turnover bank-financed stock
purchases in return for the passage of legislation desired by the financier”).
33. Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, repealed by Act of
Sept. 1, 1985, 69th Leg., R.S., ch. 479, § 224, 1985 Tex. Gen. Laws 1652, 1719.
34. Id. § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, 1097.
35. Compare Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. H.B. 2, 63d Leg., R.S. (1973)
(containing several classes for registration, such as employees of those who influence legislation), with
Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096 (containing only two classes
for registration) (repealed 1985).
36. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West Supp. 2012) (resembling the
registration provisions of the Lobby Control Act).
37. Compare Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, § 11, 1957
Tex. Gen. Laws 17, 20 (maintaining early Penal Code language on “appeal to reason”) (repealed
1973), with Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096 (lacking the
language of “appeal to reason”) (repealed 1985).
38. See Lobby Control Act, 63d Leg., R.S., ch. 422, §§ 5–6, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096,
1097–98 (describing registration and the information to be disclosed) (repealed 1985).
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3. 1991
The progression of Texas statutes from prohibiting to regulating the
conduct of lobbyists was muddled by difficult and sometimes conflicting
statutory requirements and regulatory exceptions.
However, the Lobby Control Act of 1973 established a framework for
local lobby ordinances that followed. These notable frames included the
triggering mechanisms of communication, compensation, and
expenditures, the addition of disclosure requirements, as well as the
enumeration of certain exceptions.39 Almost twenty years later, the
current Texas Lobby Law was passed on the heels of a media uproar after
poultry magnate Lonnie “Bo” Pilgrim handed out $10,000 campaign
contributions on the senate floor during a debate on workers
compensation legislation in which he had a strong interest.40
The 72nd Legislature passed two significant measures to set the stage for
future ethics regulation in Texas. The first was the passage of Senate Joint
Resolution 8, a constitutional amendment that established the Texas
Ethics Commission, which was adopted by the voters on November 5,
1991.41 The second was the passage of Senate Bill 1, the implementing
legislation for the yet-to-be adopted constitutional amendment.42 This
legislation effected revisions to existing lobby law and regulated
communications with all state-level officials and employees, including, for
the first time, communications designed to influence the outcome of
administrative actions.43 The reforms, however, did not reach officials
below the state level, nor did they reach federal activities or the state
judiciary.44 Unlike other states that have extended lobby laws to local

39. See generally id. § 3, 1973 Tex. Gen. Laws 1096, 1097 (regulating activities based on
communication, compensation, and expenditures) (repealed 1985).
40. See Texas Businessman Hands Out $10,000 Checks in State Senate, N.Y. TIMES (July 9,
1989), http://www.nytimes.com/1989/07/09/us/texas-businessman-hands-out-10000-checks-in-state
-senate.html (reporting on Lonnie Pilgrim’s contributions). See generally Act of Jan. 1, 1992, 72d
Leg., R.S., ch. 304, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290 (chronicling amendments and expansions on thenexisting lobby laws), amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 4.03, 1995 Tex.
Gen. Laws 4999 (current version at GOV’T § 305.003 (West Supp. 2012)).
41. Tex. S.J. Res. 8, 72d Leg., R.S., 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 3520, 3520–21 (amending the
Constitution to create the Texas Ethics Commission); see TEX. CONST. art. III, § 24a (providing for
the Texas Ethics Commission).
42. Act of Jan. 1, 1992, 72d Leg., R.S., ch. 304, § 2.06, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290, 1308,
amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 4999, 5000
(current version at GOV’T § 305.005 (West Supp. 2012)).
43. Id. § 2.03, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1290, 1304–05, amended by Act of Sept. 1, 1995, 74th
Leg., R.S., ch. 996, § 4.03.
44. Id.
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public sector officials and servants,45 Texas has not addressed lobbying at
the local level; instead, it has relied on prohibitions in the Texas Penal
Code and piecemeal restrictions at the local level.
4. 2003
In 2002, for the first time since its creation, the Texas Ethics
Commission endured the scrutiny of the Texas Sunset Commission,
leading to the generation of legislation that would subject the Commission
to oversight.46 The law regulating lobbyists was basically left intact, other
than changes to expenditure reporting47 and conflict of interest rules,48
which clarified its application to both lawyers and non-lawyers.49
B. Current Code
1. Chapter 305 of the Government Code
Texas lobbying regulations are primarily located in Chapter 305 of the
Government Code and in the rules adopted by the Texas Ethics
Commission pursuant to Chapter 305.50 This statute and the applicable
rules will be referred to collectively as the “Lobby Law.” Some provisions
of Chapter 305 apply to all members of the public, as well as all state
employees, and not merely to registrants under the Code.51 Generally,
45. See, e.g., N.Y. LEGIS. LAW art. 1-A, § 1-c (McKinney 2008) (applying to the passage of
local laws).
46. See Act of Sept. 1, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 249, § 1.02, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1123,
1123 (making the Texas Ethics Commission subject to oversight), amended by Act of June 17, 2011,
82d Leg., R.S., ch. 1232, § 1.03, 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 3278, 3278 (current version at GOV’T
§ 571.022 (West Supp. 2012)).
47. See id. § 4.06, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1123, 1147 (changing disclosures), amended by Act
Relating to Reporting of Expenditures by Persons Registered As Lobbyists, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 206,
§ 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 366, 367 (current version at GOV’T § 305.0061 (West Supp. 2012)).
48. See id. § 4.08, 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 1123, 1148–49 (altering the meaning of a conflict of
interest), amended by Act Relating to Prohibited Conflicts of Interest of Registered Lobbyists, 79th
Leg., R.S., ch. 218, §§ 1, 3, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 382, 382–83 (current version at GOV’T § 305.028
(West Supp. 2012)).
49. The provisions of the lobby law conflicts statute, while patterned after the conflicts
language contained in 1.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules, is in some ways more encompassing than
the provisions traditionally applied to lawyers. The lawyer–lobbyist is governed by and subject to
both provisions.
50. See GOV’T ch. 305 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (putting forth lobby regulations); 1 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE ch. 34 (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Regulation of Lobbyists) (providing further
regulation).
51. Compare GOV’T § 305.003 (West Supp. 2012) (referring to persons required to register,
defined as “registrants” in section 305.002(9) of the Texas Government Code), with id. § 305.002(8)
(referring generally to persons, defined as “an individual, corporation, association, firm, partnership,
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however, the provisions apply to those individuals or entities required to
register under Chapter 305 and Chapter 34 of the Commission rules.52 It
is important to note that the term “registrant” means anyone required to
register as a lobbyist, including both those that have properly registered
and those that should have registered, but have failed to do so.53 While
entities are considered persons under the Code and are required to register,
they may avoid registration if an associated lobbyist reports the income or
expenditures that the entity would otherwise have to report.54
There is no statutory or regulatory definition of “lobbyist,” but the
requisite analysis begins with a parsing of what it means to communicate.
The key element that must exist before registration is required is that a
person must “communicate directly with one or more members of the
legislative or executive branch to influence legislation or administrative
action.”55 To communicate means to “contact in person or by telephone,
telegraph, letter, facsimile, electronic mail, or other electronic means of
communication.”56 Through its advisory opinions, the Texas Ethics
Commission has determined that “goodwill communications,” which may
not even reference a client’s interest or request any active consideration, are
considered direct communications that trigger a registration
determination.57 Goodwill is considered a communication “to generate or
maintain goodwill for the purpose of influencing potential future
legislation” or administrative action.58
Once a person is deemed to have communicated pursuant to Chapter
305, there are two statutory thresholds that determine whether registration
is required. The operative terminology in the Lobby Law is that once a
person directly communicates to influence legislation or administrative

committee, club, organization, or group of persons who are voluntarily acting in concert”).
52. See id. § 305.0021 (governing a registrant and his agent); 1 ADMIN. § 34.81 (2012) (Tex.
Ethics Comm’n, Election to File Annually) (addressing the activity report of a registrant).
53. See GOV’T § 305.002(9) (defining registrant as a person who must register under section
305.003).
54. See id. § 305.002 (defining registrant to include entities); 1 ADMIN. § 34.45 (2012) (Tex.
Ethics Comm’n, Entity Registration) (authorizing this exception to entity registration).
55. GOV’T § 305.003; 1 ADMIN. § 34.41 (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Expenditure
Threshold).
56. GOV’T § 305.002; 1 ADMIN. § 34.1 (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Definitions).
57. See Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 94, at 1 (1992) (paying travel expenses required
registration); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 90, at 2 (1992) (making a deer lease available for trips is
communication); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 89, at 3 (1992) (holding there could be direct
communication during a hunting trip); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 34, at 1 (1992) (hosting
parties requires registration).
58. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 467, at 1 (2006).
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action, he, she, or it59 triggers a need to determine if one of the thresholds
requiring registration has been crossed.
The first type of threshold is based on expenditures made for the
practice of lobbying. Once a person communicates directly, she must
consider the current calendar quarter and determine if she has spent $500
or more in certain reportable lobby expenditures.60 If she has, then she
must register.61
The second type of threshold is tied to the amount of compensation
received for lobby activities. A person paid or expected to be paid $1,000
or more in a calendar quarter is required to register when communicating
directly to influence legislation or the outcome of any administrative
action.62 The term legislation is defined broadly in the Code63 so it
becomes difficult to envision any matter that would not fit into the
definition. The definition of administrative action is equally broad:
“‘Administrative action’ means rulemaking, licensing, or any other matter
that may be the subject of action by a state agency or executive branch
office . . . includ[ing] the proposal, consideration, or approval of the
matter or negotiations concerning the matter.”64
59. GOV’T § 305.002 (including entities in the Lobby Law definition of person).
60. See id. § 305.003 (deferring the amount of expenditure to commission rule); 1 ADMIN.
§ 34.41 (making $500 the minimum expenditure). The $500 requisite does not include personal
expenses for travel, food or lodging. GOV’T § 305.003(a)(1). The Texas Government Code states
that the minimum statutory amount will be $200, but defers to the Commission to set any amount
above that. Id.
61. GOV’T § 305.003(a)(1) (authorizing the Ethics Commission to set the amount); 1 ADMIN.
§ 34.41(a) (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Expenditure Threshold) (requiring registration if
expenditures exceed $500). The Commission has set the compensation threshold at $1,000, but
retains the power to change that amount by rule. GOV’T§ 305.003(a)(2); 1 ADMIN. § 34.43(a)
(2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Compensation and Reimbursement Threshold).
62. GOV’T § 305.003(a)(2); 1 ADMIN. § 34.43(a).
63. GOV’T § 305.002(6).
64. Id. § 305.002(1) (defining administrative action). The potential of requiring lobby
registration for everyone in the state who was paid a minimal sum over a calendar quarter to
communicate with any state level official or employee was so broad that the original working group
convened to assist with the implementation of the new law recommended a rulemaking to address
the issue. See 21 Tex. Reg. 11820 (1996) (codified at 1 ADMIN. § 34.43) (adopting the 5%
provision). Thus was born the “5% rule.” 1 ADMIN. § 34.43. Once communication occurs,
triggering possible registration, individuals must then determine if they have been compensated more
than $1,000 in that quarter. Id. If so, they must register if they have spent 5% or more of their
compensated time communicating or preparing to communicate during the same quarter. See id.
(accounting for communication and the preparation to communicate). The Ethics Commission
adopted a rule defining the elements of preparation time to consider in the calculation of 5%. Id.
§ 34.3 (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Compensation for Preparation Time). In short, anything done to
bring a person up to speed, educate, refresh, strategize, or other background preparation for
communication counts toward the 5% threshold. See id. (describing preparations to communicate).

FISCHER_FINAL

2013]

6/3/2013 10:54 AM

The Advent of State and Local Lobby Regulations

45

2. Exceptions
Despite the broad definition of actions that trigger the registration
requirements, the legislature has statutorily provided numerous
exceptions.65 The most prevalent statutory exceptions to the registration
requirements include exceptions for: (1) those individuals whose influential
communication with the legislature or executive branch involves “an
appearance before or testimony . . . in a hearing conducted by or on behalf
of either the legislative or the executive branch and who does not receive
special or extra compensation for the appearance other than actual
expenses incurred in attending the hearing;”66 and (2) written
communications by an attorney of record in a docketed case before a state
agency.67 The statute also recognizes that certain individuals attempting
to influence state purchasing decisions warrant exemption from the
registration requirements.68 Consequently, communications regarding
certain agency purchasing decisions may be exempt depending on the
monetary value of the procurement, whether the person attempting to
influence the sale is an employee or a contractor, and whether the
compensation to be paid is on a contingency basis.69
In addition to the statutory exceptions, the Texas Ethics Commission,
by rule, has established exceptions to the compensation threshold.70
Certain exceptions are particularly relevant for practicing lawyers. For
example, communicating with state personnel or providing testimony in
connection with an adjudicative proceeding or litigation does not trigger
registration, nor do communications relating to an agency’s rulemaking
process.71
These triggers, thresholds, and exceptions are important to understand
because they serve as the basis for most of the local lobby ordinances
subsequently discussed in this Article.
Unanswered—and to date unasked—questions remain in the discussion
of the implications of registration provisions on non-typical state entities.
The 5% threshold also includes time spent engaging in goodwill communications. See id. (counting
time used to influence legislation).
65. See, e.g., GOV’T § 305.004 (West 2005) (enumerating exceptions from the registration
requirements of Chapter 305).
66. Id. § 305.004(2).
67. Id. § 305.003(c) (West Supp. 2012).
68. Id. § 305.0041(a).
69. Id. § 304.0041(a).
ETHICS
COMM’N
RULES
§ 34.5
(Dec.
2012),
available
at
70. TEX.
http://www.ethics.state.tx.us/rules/rules12.pdf.
71. Id. (outlining activities not invoking the registration requirements of Chapter 305).
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For example, the question of the need to register when communicating
with state university employees to influence their decisions regarding
research projects or grants is but one of literally scores of “communications
triggering registration” hypothetical dilemmas that might present problems
if presented as a complaint to the Commission or proper prosecutorial
authority.
3. Criminal Enforcement Provisions
Chapter 305 contains language creating a Class A misdemeanor offense
if that person “intentionally or knowingly violates a provision of this
chapter.”72 However, it is a third degree felony for a person to retain a
lobbyist, or for a person to lobby, “for compensation that is totally or
partially contingent on the passage or defeat of any legislation . . . veto of
legislation . . . or administrative action.”73
The prohibition on
contingent-fee lobbying has made its way into several local lobby
ordinances, albeit in different forms, with some localities prohibiting the
practice74 while others simply require its disclosure.75
Title 8 of the Texas Penal Code, entitled “Offenses Against Public
Administration,” contains eight offenses under the heading “Bribery and
Corrupt Influence.”76 Any attorney interacting with public servants at the
state or local level should be aware of Title 8, or risk inadvertently violating
its provisions. Practitioners who provide any type of benefit to public
officials or employees should be cognizant of the gift restrictions, and
relevant exceptions, found in Chapter 36.77 To avail oneself of the
exceptions to the gift statute, an advocate must be familiar with the
definitions, prohibitions, and exceptions in the Code, and be able to
reconcile those with any applicable local regulations.78
The Texas Penal Code creates two separate offenses related to gifts, or
“benefits” in statutory language. First, it is a crime to solicit or receive a
gift, and second, it is a separate offense to offer or give a gift.79
72. GOV’T § 305.031(a) (West Supp. 2012).
73. Id. §§ 305.022(a), 305.031(b) (West 2005 & West Supp. 2012).
74. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 48, § 488(C) (2012) (prohibiting persons
engaged in lobbying from receiving compensation on a contingent fee basis).
75. See, e.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. IIIA, § 12A15.5(c)(4) (2012) (allowing
lobbyists to receive compensation on a contingent fee basis but requiring its disclosure).
76. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 8, ch. 36 (West 2011 & Supp. 2012).
77. See id. §§ 36.08–.10 (outlining the restrictions and exceptions to providing gifts to public
servants).
78. See id. tit. 8, ch. 36 (defining terms applicable to gift statute, promulgating prohibitions on
providing gifts to public servants, and listing exceptions to prohibited conduct).
79. See id. §§ 36.08–.09 (West 2011) (bifurcating offenses relating to gifts to public servants
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Significantly, gift prohibitions do not prescribe a culpable mental state.80
Therefore, the required mental state must be ascertained from Penal Code
section 6.02, which deems proof of recklessness sufficient for sustaining a
conviction.81
Section 36.10 of the Penal Code sets out exceptions to the gift laws.82
The statute further states that sections 36.08 and 38.09 “[do] not apply to
food, lodging, transportation, or entertainment accepted as a guest and, if
the donee [and donor] is required by law to report those items, reported by
the donee [and donor] in accordance with that law.”83 To take advantage
of this exception, both the donor and donee must meet relevant reporting
requirements.84
There are numerous state statutes requiring (1) the reporting of gifts;85
(2) that certain public officials file personal financial statements;86 and (3)
adherence to the conflict of interest provisions for public officials and
vendors.87 However, the adoption of each municipal ethics ordinance
brings a new legal reporting requirement. Therefore, in the event an
attorney provides food, lodging, transportation, or entertainment to a
public official, before that lawyer can rely on the defense provided by
section 36.10(c), those expenses must be reported in accordance with the
reporting requirements established by the municipal’s lobby ordinance.
Otherwise, both the lawyer and the local official face Class A misdemeanor
charges.
Title 8 of the Penal Code creates another offense that is equally punitive
but disturbingly vague. The crime of improper influence harkens back to
the original prohibition on lobbying, by making it an offense for a person
to privately address a “public servant who exercises or will exercise official
into one that penalizes receiving a gift and another that penalizes giving a gift).
80. Hubbard v. State, 668 S.W.2d 419, 421 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984), rev’d on other grounds,
739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en banc); see PENAL §§ 36.08–.09 (failing to establish a
requisite mental state for the offenses).
81. PENAL § 6.02 (West 2011); Hubbard, 668 S.W.2d at 421.
82. PENAL § 36.10 (West Supp. 2012).
83. Id. § 36.10(b), (c).
84. See id. § 36.10(b) (controlling donee reporting); id. § 36.10(c) (governing donor
reporting).
85. E.g., TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.006(b) (West Supp. 2012) (itemizing what categories
of gifts must be reported)
86. See id. § 572.021 (West 2012) (requiring certain state officials to file a personal financial
statement); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 145.001, 145.003 (West 2008) (obligating municipal
officials for cities with a population over 100,000 to file personal financial statements); id.
§§ 159.001, 159.003 (West 2008 & West Supp. 2012) (mandating county officials for cities with a
population over 100,000 must file personal financial statements).
87. See generally LOC. GOV’T ch. 171 & 176 (West 2008 & Supp. 2012).
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discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with [the] intent to influence the
outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations other than those
authorized by law.”88 Neither the statute nor case law provides much
guidance as to what is meant by “considerations other than those
authorized by law.”89
In City of Stephenville v. Texas Parks & Wildlife Department,90 the court
found evidence of influence that was both blatant and effective.91 While
both were embroiled in a contested case pending before a state
commission, a lawyer met privately with a state commissioner and offered
to help get the commissioner re-appointed by the governor.92 Judging
from the facts recounted in the court’s opinion, the influence was quite
effective: the commissioner changed his vote, reversing the commission’s
prior action.93 Should an attorney interacting with local officials be
concerned about the offense of improper influence or the manner in which
it may intersect with a local lobby ordinance? Would communication with
a local official in violation of a local lobby ordinance constitute an attempt
to “influence the outcome of the proceeding on the basis of considerations
other than those authorized by law”?94 Would compliance with a local
lobby ordinance validate an otherwise questionable private entreaty? These
are all issues for the cautious lawyer to take into consideration.
Both the bribery statute95 and the gift statutes96 recognize the role of
lobby activities, expressly exempting transactions made in accordance with
the Lobby Law.97 The bribery statute provides that a benefit offered,
conferred, solicited, or accepted is permissible if made and reported in
accordance with Chapter 305 of the Government Code.98 It remains an
offense if the benefit is offered, conferred, solicited, or accepted “pursuant
88. PENAL § 36.04(a) (West 2011) (emphasis added). An “adjudicatory proceeding” includes
“any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers,
duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined.” Id. § 36.04(b).
89. Id. § 36.04(a).
90. City of Stephenville v. Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t, 940 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. App.—Austin
1996, writ denied).
91. Id. at 671.
92. Id. at 672.
93. Id. at 673.
94. PENAL § 36.04(a).
95. Id. § 36.02 (West 2011).
96. Id. §§ 36.08–.09.
97. See id. § 36.02(d) (excepting “expenditure[s] made and reported in accordance with
Chapter 305, Government Code” from the bribery penalty); id. § 36.10(a)(5) (West Supp. 2012)
(exempting “a gift, award, or memento to a member of the legislative or executive branch that is
required to be reported under Chapter 305, Government Code”).
98. Id. § 36.02(d) (West 2011).
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to an express agreement to take or withhold [an act] of official discretion”;
however, prosecution of such an offense requires direct evidence of an
express agreement.99 The exceptions to the general prohibition on the
giving and receiving of gifts also incorporate the Lobby Law by exempting
any “gift, award, or memento to a member of the legislative or executive
branch that is required to be reported under Chapter 305.”100
During the previous century, the state law relating to lobbying has
moved from outright prohibition to a well-regulated system with an
emphasis on disclosure. Even the Penal Code has been modified to
account for the Lobby Law.101 This incremental movement toward
disclosure continues in Texas through the present day; municipalities have
implemented the tenets of a regulated and transparent system at the local
level in an attempt to address issues of influence peddling.102 As discussed
immediately below, the evolution of state-level lobby restrictions is readily
apparent in local jurisdictions’ attempts to monitor and regulate the
practice of lobbying.
4. The Advent of Lobby Ordinances in Major Texas Cities
There are inherent legal limitations that account for lobby regulations
among municipalities as opposed to other local political subdivisions.
Cities, especially home rule municipalities, have broad ordinance-making
authority.103 Such municipalities have the implied authority to regulate
99. Id. § 36.02(a)(4) (“[N]ot withstanding any rule of evidence or jury instruction allowing
factual inferences in the absence of certain evidence, direct evidence of the express agreement shall be
required in any prosecution under this subdivision.”).
100. Id. § 36.10(a)(5) (West Supp. 2012).
101. Compare Act to Define and Punish Lobbying, 30th Leg., R.S., ch. 79, 1907 Tex. Gen.
Laws 162, 162–63 (prohibiting any form of lobbying regardless of value gift or level of inducement
and providing no exceptions to the prohibition) (repealed 1957), with PENAL ch. 36 (West 2011 &
Supp. 2012) (condemning the exercise of undue influence and requiring the disclosure of gifts, but
providing exceptions to lobbying offenses).
102. See AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE ch. 4-8 (2012) (requiring the registration of all lobbyists
and the disclosure of all municipal issues on which the person has lobbied); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE
ch. 12A, art. IIIA, § 12A15.5 (2012) (necessitating the registration of all lobbyists and mandating
the disclosure of all issues for which the person has lobbied); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch.
2.94, §§ 2.94.040, 2.94.060 (2012) (governing the registration of lobbyists and disclosure of all
municipal questions for which the person has lobbied); HOUS., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 18, art. V,
§§ 1872, 1874 (2012) (mandating the registration of lobbyists and the disclosure of subjects on
which influence was expended); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. 2,
§ 245 (2012) (prohibiting the acceptance or solicitation of gifts or benefits to influence official
conduct).
103. See TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (outlining the ability of cities to amend their charters and
levy taxes); TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 51.071, 51.072(a) (West. 2008) (declaring that homerule municipalities have full local self-government powers).
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professions and interactions with city officials.104 Just as importantly as
the right to regulate, cities have the ability to criminally enforce violations
of their ordinances.105 Pursuant to state statute, ordinance violations are
fine-only offenses, with punishment generally capped at $500 per
offense.106 However, cities may also impose other noncriminal sanctions
against violators, such as prohibiting culpable parties from contracting
with the city.107 On the other hand, counties rely on express authority
delegated by the legislature.108 Consequently, counties have taken varying
approaches to the regulation of lobbying at the county level. As a result of
developing local rules, people who have become accustomed to interacting
with local officials—people like lawyers, engineers, surveyors, contractors,
salesmen, and vendors—may find themselves held to new regulatory
standards when engaging in their normal course of business. They may
also find themselves lawfully limited in their ability to interact with any
public servant because of the application of various Penal Code provisions.
Therefore, it is increasingly important to be aware of local rules and the
limitations placed on officers, employees, contractors, vendors, and the
like.
Of course, as with all local rules, standards and processes vary from
entity to entity. Each entity that has adopted a regulatory mechanism for
local lobbyists has devised its own threshold for lobby registration, its own
reporting requirements, and its own limitations on lobby activities. It is
not enough, however, to know the regulations affecting the local lobbyist;
those seeking to influence local government must also know the local
regulations governing the conduct of the public officials and employees
whose favor is sought, as well as the criminal laws that impact all public
servants.
To date, municipal lobby ordinances have been adopted primarily by
major metropolitan municipalities in Texas. This Article will focus on the
lobby policies adopted by the cities of Austin, Dallas, El Paso, Houston,
104. See LOC. GOV’T § 51.072(a) (granting immense power to home-rule cities to govern all
matters “incident to local self-government”); City of Beaumont v. Bond, 546 S.W.2d 407, 411 (Tex.
Civ. App.—Beaumont 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“The legislative power granted to [home-rule] cities
. . . is analogous to such power granted to the legislature.”).
105. LOC. GOV’T § 54.001(a) (West 2008) (providing the power to enforce rules and provide
punishment for violations).
106. Id. § 54.001(b) (mandating a $500 cap for fines or penalties, but allowing fines up to
$2,000 for certain offenses, such as dumping of refuse).
107. Cf. id. § 54.004 (granting municipalities the broad power for the preservation of the
municipality and those living there).
108. City of Laredo v. Webb Cnty., 220 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, no pet.)
(citing City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 28 (Tex. 2003)).
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and San Antonio. Most adopt the primary structure found in the state
Lobby Law. Obvious similarities will become apparent among certain
cities; for instance, the ordinances of San Antonio and Dallas are virtual
duplicates of one another,109 while Austin and El Paso reflect each other
in detailed specificity.110 The common elements of lobby regulations are
to be expected; however, it is the superficially minor differences among
jurisdictions that pose potential issues for legal practitioners. This Article
identifies the common elements as well as the small meaningful
distinctions, and aims to explain the significance of each.
The development of local lobby policies has not been uniform, and each
municipality covered in this Article has its own unique history that has
informed the development of its regulatory framework. Dallas, for
instance, overhauled its existing Code of Conduct for city officers and
former officers in 2001.111 However, a bribery scandal involving builders
of low-income housing that funneled bribes to a councilman presaged the
adoption of a lobby registration ordinance in late 2009.112
Houston city officials also faced charges and convictions for official
misconduct, including federal bribery charges. In 2005, the mayor’s chief
of staff accepted cash in exchange for offering a vendor inside information
on airport and parking meter contracts; the city’s building services director
also accepted bribes, including a trip to the Super Bowl, from a vendor
competing for an energy contract.113 In 2011, facing criticism that
attorneys received an unfair advantage under the lobby ordinance,
Houston’s City Council adopted changes specifically targeted at lawyers

109. Compare SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 265
(2012) (outlining the registration requirements for lobbyists in San Antonio, with very similar
language as the Dallas code), with DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. IIIA, § 12A15.5 (2012)
(identifying the requirements and procedures for lobbyist registration under the Dallas City Code,
using language similar to the San Antonio code).
110. Compare AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-4 (2012) , with EL PASO, TEX.,
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.040 (2012) (requiring lobbyists in El Paso to register under
conditions very similar to the Austin code).
111. See Preface, CITY OF DALLAS CODE OF ETHICS (2000), available at
http://www.dallascityhall.com/pdf/Ethics/CodeOfEthics.pdf (declaring the old code of conduct
repealed and the new code of ethics to be in place effective January 1, 2001).
112. Dana Enfinger, Housing Scandal Rocks Dallas, HOUSINGFINANCE.COM (Mar. 1, 2008),
http://www.housingfinance.com/affordable-housing/housing-scandal-rocks-dallas.aspx
(explaining
the details of the scandal); see DALL., TEX., ORDINANCE 27748 (Nov. 9, 2009) (indicating the
addition of a lobby registration section to the Dallas Code of Ethics in November of 2009).
113. David Feldstein, Man Who Bribed 2 Officials in Houston Gets 15 Years, HOUS. CHRON.
(Nov. 17, 2005), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Man-who-bribed-2-officials-inHouston-gets-15-1574923.php.
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advocating on municipal issues.114 The changes generally tracked the
state Lobby Law and now require all persons lobbying, including
attorneys, to register.115 In 2012, there were approximately sixty-seven
registered lobbyists representing close to ninety clients.116
The City of San Antonio has one of the oldest and most comprehensive
lobby ordinances, originally adopted in November of 1998.117 The
ordinance was revised in 2004 as the result of a thorough review by the
mayor’s integrity unit and a city ethics panel the previous year.118 Due in
part to its age, and in part to the comprehensive nature of its restrictions,
the San Antonio Ethics Panel has developed a significant library of ethics
advisory opinions designed to provide interpretive guidance for ordinance
compliance.119 About thirty individuals or entities currently register as
lobbyists with the City of San Antonio.120
The City of Austin has also adopted a comprehensive lobby
ordinance,121 and the city currently lists over fifty registrants.122 The
City of El Paso, which adopted a lobby ordinance in 2006,123
incorporates many components of Austin’s policy and currently reflects

114. See Bradley Olsen, Houston City Leaders Look to Tighten Ethics, Lobbying Rules, HOUS.
CHRON. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-city-leaderslook-to-tighten-ethics-1609644.php (discussing the proposal before the City Council to close the
loophole allowing lawyers to advocate for municipal issues without registering as lobbyists).
115. See HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72 (2012) (declaring who
must register as a lobbyist under the municipal code); see also id. § 18-71 (codifying a broadly
inclusive definition of person).
116. See List of Lobbyists, OFFICE OF THE CITY SECRETARY (Jan. 10, 2013),
http://www.houstontx.gov/citysec/lobbyists/Jan2013.xls (listing the sixty-seven registered lobbyists in
Houston representing eighty-five different clients).
117. See CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, LOBBYIST HANDBOOK 1 (2010), available at
http://www.sanantonio.gov/clerk/ethics/LobbyistHandbook2010.pdf (declaring the City of San
Antonio established its lobbyist regulations in 1998).
118. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., ORDINANCE 98709 (Jan. 15, 2004), available at
https://webapps1.sanantonio.gov/archivedagendas/CC02011/4v$v01!.pdf (amending the San
Antonio Ethics Code to include new provisions regarding lobbyist fees).
119. See Ethics Review Board Opinions, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, http://www.sanantonio.gov/
atty/ethics/formal.htm (last visited May 9, 2013) (demonstrating the volume of opinions generated
since the inception of the Ethics Review Board).
120. See City of San Antonio Lobbyists’ Clients, CITY OF SAN ANTONIO (Nov. 26, 2012, 11:19
AM), http://sanantonio.gov/clerk/ethics/lobbyists.pdf (listing all the registered lobbyists and their
clients in San Antonio, with twenty-four lobbyists registered).
121. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8 (2012).
122. View Lobbyist, CITY OF AUSTIN, http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/cityclerk/lobbyist/list_
lobbyists.cfm (last visited May 9, 2013).
123. See EL PASO, TEX., ORDINANCE 16300 (Mar. 7, 2006) (approving the addition of a
section of municipal code regulating the activities of lobbyists).
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twenty-six registered lobbyists.124
III. COMMON ELEMENTS OF LOBBY REGULATION SYSTEMS
In crafting local lobby ordinances, large Texas municipalities have relied
on state law for guidance. The more sophisticated regulations include
common elements such as: definitions of communication, compensation
and expenditure thresholds, parameters for the matter being advocated for
or against, and disclosure requirements.125 However, each of these
elements may differ in slight, but significant, ways from locality to locality.
Moreover, each lobby ordinance treats attorneys differently and imposes
different limitations and obligations on local lobbying by lawyers. Rather
than present a detailed analysis of the various local lobby ordinances
(which are frequently changed or updated), this Article highlights common
elements, recognizes some meaningful distinctions, and illuminates the
impact on legal advocacy at the local level.
A. Compensation and Expenditures
Local lobbyist limitations were clearly inspired by the state Lobby Law
definition of compensation as “money, service, facility, or other thing of
value or financial benefit that is received or is to be received in return for
or in connection with services rendered or to be rendered.”126 The major
cities with lobbyist regulations—Austin, Dallas, El Paso, Houston, and
San Antonio—each define compensation in generally similar language.127
Even small distinctions among local definitions are worth noting, however,
as they could have a meaningful impact on determining whether a person
is required to register as a lobbyist.
The City of Austin’s basic definition of compensation128 tracks
Chapter 305 of the Government Code word for word, and that same
124. Registered Lobbyists, CITY OF EL PASO, http://www.elpasotexas.gov/muni_clerk/registered_
lobbyist.asp (last visited May 9, 2012).
125. Cf. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. ch. 305 (West 2005 & Supp. 2012) (providing specific
parameters for the regulation and registration of lobbyists under state law, upon which many
municipalities built their local regulations).
126. Id. § 305.002(3) (West Supp. 2012).
127. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(2) (2012) (“money, service, facility[,]
or other thing of value or financial benefit”); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A,
§ 12A15.2(3)(A) (2012) (“money, service, facility, or other thing of value”); EL PASO, TEX., MUN.
CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012) (“money or other tangible thing of value”); HOUS., TEX.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012) (“money, service, facility, or other thing of
value or benefit”); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-62(c)
(2012) (“money or any other thing of value”).
128. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(2) (2012).
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definition originated in the 1957 Representation Before the Legislature
Act.129 The City of Houston’s definition of compensation130 also tracks
the definition in Chapter 305, but with a potentially significant one-word
distinction: whereas state law refers to a “thing of value or financial
benefit,” Houston’s ordinance removes the word “financial,” thereby
broadening the type of benefit that may qualify as compensation and
trigger registration.131 The City of El Paso offers a shorter—if not
simpler—definition of compensation as “money or other tangible thing of
value” that is received in return for lobby services.132
The ordinances of both Dallas and San Antonio delve into the intent
and structure behind compensation arrangements by adding a level of
scrutiny to the relationship between advocate and client. In defining
compensation, the Dallas ordinance stipulates that lobbyists engaging in
lobbying and similar advocacy must include all amounts received “if, for
the purpose of evading the lobby obligations imposed under this article,
the lobbyist has structured the receipt of compensation in a way that
unreasonably minimizes the value of the lobbying activities.”133 The City
of San Antonio lobby ordinance includes almost identical language.134
Each of these ordinances, with the exception of Houston’s, excludes
certain types of payments from the definition of compensation. These
exceptions include payments made to a person regardless of whether the
person was engaged in lobbying activities if those payments are ordinarily
made.135 They also except any gain from the determination of a
129. See Representation Before the Legislature Act, 55th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 9, 1957 Tex. Gen.
Laws 17, 17 (establishing the definition of compensation to be used in future lobbyist statutes)
(repealed 1973).
130. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012).
131. Compare GOV’T § 305.002(3) (“‘Compensation’ means money, service, facility, or other
thing of value of financial benefit that is received.”), with HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012) (“Compensation means money, service, facility, or other thing of value or
benefit that is received . . . .”).
132. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012).
133. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(3)(C) (2012).
134. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(c) (2012)
(“If a lobbyist engages in both lobbying activities and other activities on behalf of a person,
compensation for lobbying includes all amounts received from that person, if, for the purpose of
evading the obligations imposed under division 5, the lobbyist has structured the receipt of
compensation in a way that unreasonably minimizes the value of the lobbying activities.”).
135. See AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2 (2012) (stating compensation does
not include incidental expenses); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(B) (2012)
(excluding incidental expense from compensation); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit 2, ch 2.94,
§ 2.94.020 (2012) (stating compensation excludes incidental expenses); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE
OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(d) (2012) (limiting expenditures by not including
incidental expenses).
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municipal question, unless the value is in the form of a contingent fee.136
Austin, Dallas, El Paso, and Houston each establish a compensation
threshold of $200 in a calendar quarter; less than this will not trigger the
registration requirements.137 In addition to the quarterly threshold, the
City of Houston requires registration for anyone who has been paid $800
in a calendar year for lobbying services.138 The City of San Antonio,
however, has no minimum threshold; compensation or an expenditure of
any amount will trigger registration requirements for not only persons paid
for the lobbying services, but also for those paying for lobbying
services.139
As with state law, compensation is one of two financial thresholds that
trigger registration.140 A person is also required to register if he crosses
the relevant expenditure threshold.141
The local definitions of
expenditure are relatively uniform and generally reflect the state law
definition. Generally, the definitions of expenditure include “a payment,
distribution, loan, advance, reimbursement, deposit, or gift of money or
any thing of value, including a contract, promise, or agreement, whether or
not legally enforceable.”142
B. City Officials
Each locality with an established lobby regulation process has adopted
its own unique class of decision makers with whom communication
triggers registration. Again, while there is general consistency, minor
136. See AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE ch 4-8, § 4-8-2 (2012) (“Compensation shall not include
the financial gain that [a] person may realize as a result of the determination of a municipal question,
unless that gain is in the form of a contingent fee.”); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit 2, ch. 2.94
§ 2.94.020 (2012) (“Compensation shall not include the financial gain that a person may realize as a
result of the determination of a municipal question, unless that gain is in the form of a contingent
fee.”); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V § 2-62(c) (2012)
(“Compensation does not include the financial gain that a person may realize as a result of the
determination of a municipal question, unless that gain is in the form of a contingent fee.”).
137. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-4(1) (2012); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE
ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.3(a)(1) (2012); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94,
§ 2.94.040(A)(1) (2012); HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72(a)(1)
(2012).
138. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72(a)(2) (2012).
139. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.2, art. III, div. V, § 2-63 (2012)
(requiring registration of any person who “engages in lobbying activities for compensation” as well as
any person who “expends monies for lobbying activities”).
140. See 1 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 34.43(a) (2012) (Tex. Ethics Comm’n, Compensation and
Reimbursement Threshold).
141. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-4(3) (2012) (mandating
registration of a person who “expends $200 or more in a calendar quarter for lobbying”).
142. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012).
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differences between municipalities are important to note.
The City of El Paso offers the simplest and most straightforward class of
decision makers, defining a city official to include the mayor, any council
member, the city manager, or members of certain boards, commissions,
and committees.143
The City of Austin’s lobby ordinance broadens the definition to include
staff, expressly naming “the mayor, a councilmember, or a member of the
City staff” or a designated board, commission, or committee.144 The
“applicability” section of the ordinance applies to a person who lobbies any
of the following: “the mayor, a council member, their aides . . . a member
of a board, [or] task force . . . the city manager, an assistant city manager,
their aides, the city attorney, an assistant city attorney, [and] a department
or assistant department director.”145
The City of Dallas offers a similar definition of city official, including
the mayor and members of city council, the city manager as well as
assistant city managers, the city attorney and first assistant city attorney,
the city secretary and first assistant city secretary, the city auditor and first
assistant city auditor, municipal judges, all department directors, and a
litany of board and commission members.146
The City of San Antonio establishes the broadest definition. As with
the other ordinances discussed, it applies to the mayor and members of city
council and covers “municipal court judges and magistrates, the city
manager, deputy city manager, city clerk, assistant city clerk, assistant city
managers, . . . all department heads . . . [and] internal auditor and assistant
internal auditors.”147 In addition to including a specific list of boards and
commission members who qualify as city officials, the ordinance includes
“any other board or commission that is more than advisory in nature.”148
When compared to other ordinances, however, San Antonio’s definition
appears to reach down further into the bureaucratic structure, specifically
143. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.050 (2012); see also id. § 2.94.030
(enumerating eight specific boards and commissions whose members are included in the definition of
city official).
144. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(1) (2012).
145. Id. § 4-8-3.
146. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 15.2(1)(h)(i) to (xvi) (2012) (including
members of the board of adjustment, the building inspection board, the plan and zoning
commission, the civil service board, the community development commission, the rapid transit
board, the airport board, the ethics advisory commission, the housing finance corporation board, the
landmark commission, local government corporation boards, municipal management district boards,
park and recreation board, and all reinvestment zone boards).
147. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-62(a) (2012).
148. Id.
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including assistant department heads, assistants to city council, and
assistants to the mayor (including contract personnel), the secretary to the
city manager, executive secretaries, the community action manager, the
public utilities supervisor, and members of bid committees.149 Further,
the definition of city official includes board members of the city’s electric
and water providers.150
Rather than define city official, the City of Houston’s lobby ordinance
actually divides the municipal infrastructure into executive and legislative
departments.151 The Houston ordinance defines a “member of the
legislative branch” as “a council-member, council-member elect, or
candidate for the office of council member.”152 It offers a much broader
definition of “member of the executive branch,” which reflects the internal
operation of the city’s municipal government.153 That definition includes
the mayor (as well as candidates for mayor), the city controller (and
candidates for that office), an employee of the city, and any member of
specified boards.154
C. Communication
Whereas the state Lobby Law applies only in situations where a person
has direct communication with a member of the executive or legislative
branch, local lobby restrictions have expanded definitions in an effort to
regulate “indirect” communication with local officials.155 Only the City
of Houston tracks the state Lobby Law, regulating only direct

149. Id.
150. Id.
151. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012).
152. Id. The decision to treat candidates for office the same as actual officeholders is analogous
to the definition of “public servant” found in the Penal Code, which include candidates for public
office. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1.07(a)(41) (West Supp. 2012).
153. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012).
154. Id. The specified boards include:
The Archaeological and Historical Commission, Airport Land Use Regulations Board of
Adjustment, Automotive Board, Board of Public Trusts, Boiler Code Review and Licensing
Board, Building and Standards Commission, Civil Service Commission, Electrical Board, Fire
Board of Appeals, General Appeals Board, Helicopter Facilities Licensing and Appeals Board,
Mechanical Code Review Board, Municipal Board on Sign Control, Planning Commission,
Plumbing Code Review Board, Tower Permit Commission, or Wastewater Capacity
Reservation Review Board.
Id.
155. See, e.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-1 (2008) (including indirect
communication within the definition of lobbying).
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communication.156 Unlike the state statute, most of the local ordinances
attempt to define lobbying by incorporating the meaning of
communication within the various definitions.157
It should be noted that each local definition incorporates some generally
accepted exceptions to the definition of lobbying. Common exceptions
include communications made by a member of a media organization,158
by a public official acting within his or her official capacity,159 “a mere
request for information,”160 a statement made at a meeting conducted in
accordance with the Texas Open Meetings Act,161 official testimony at a
hearing or in a formal proceeding,162 or communication made in a
publicly available speech, article, or publication.163
The cities of Dallas and San Antonio have adopted nearly identical
definitions of the conduct that constitutes lobbying, including:
[A]ny oral or written communication (including an electronic
communication) to a city official, made directly or indirectly by any person
in an effort to influence or persuade an official to favor or oppose,
recommend or not recommend, vote for or against, or take or refrain from
taking action on any municipal question.164

The cities of Austin and El Paso share nearly identical definitions of
lobbying: the direct or indirect “solicitation of a City official, by private
interview, postal or telephonic communications, or any other means other
than public expression at a meeting of City officials.”165
When considering who constitutes a local lobbyist, it is also important
to note that most of the ordinances—like the state Lobby Law—treat as a
“registrant” anyone who is required to register as a lobbyist but has not
done so.166
156. TEX GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.002(2) (West 2009); HOUS., TEX., CODE OF
ORDINANCES ch. 18, art V, § 18-71 (2012).
157. E.g., AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-1 (2012).
158. E.g., id. § 4-8-5(1).
159. E.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2, § 2.94.050(A) (2012).
160. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(6) (2008); accord DALL., TEX., CITY
CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(10)(B)(i) (2012) (including a similar exception).
161. E.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-73(2) (2012).
162. E.g., id. § 18-73(2).
163. E.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(10)(b)(i) (2012).
164. Id. § 12A-15.2(10); see SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.2, art III, div.
V, § 2-62(i) (2012).
165. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(6) (2012); accord EL PASO, TEX.,
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012).
166. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(11) (2012); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE
ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(14) (2012); EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020
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D. Municipal Question
The registration requirements will not be triggered if a lobbyist
communicates with a covered city official on a topic other than a
municipal question.167 The Texas Ethics Commission’s inclusion of a
“goodwill communication” has not yet been incorporated into the
municipal definitions of communication; thus, communications intended
to “generate or maintain goodwill for the purpose of influencing potential
future legislation” remain unhindered at the local level.168
The cities of Dallas, El Paso, and San Antonio have adopted very similar
yet far-reaching definitions of a municipal question. Essentially, a
municipal question is any “public policy issue of a discretionary nature that
is pending before, or that may be the subject of action by, the city council
or any city board or commission.”169 The term includes, but is not
limited to, proposed actions or proposals for action in the form of
ordinances, resolutions, motions, recommendations, reports, regulations,
policies, nominations, appointments, sanctions, and bids.170 It includes
the adoption of “specifications, awards, grants, or contracts”; however, it
excludes such routine matters as “permitting, platting[,] and design
approval.”171
The City of Austin takes a slightly different approach, defining a
municipal question as a “proposed or proposal for an ordinance,
resolution, motion, recommendation, report, regulation, policy,
(2012); HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(m) (2012).
167. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, §§ 2.94.020 (2012) (defining
municipal question as “a public policy issue of a discretionary nature pending or impending before
the city council, a legislative review committee of the council, or any board, commission or
committee set forth in Section 2.94.030 of this chapter, including but not limited to a proposed or
proposal for an ordinance, resolution, motion, recommendation, report, regulation, policy,
appointment, sanction, bid, a request for proposal, including the development of specifications, an
award, grant, or contract, and all matters before the boards, commissions or committees listed in
Section 2.94.030 (B), C, D, K and L of this chapter”).
168. Cf. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 467, at 1 (2006) (declaring political contributions
intended to generate goodwill are prohibited); Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 46, at 1 (1992)
(“[C]ommunications to generate goodwill may be communications to influence[.]”).
169. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012); see EL PASO, TEX.,
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012).
170. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012); EL PASO, TEX.,
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012).
171. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012); see EL PASO, TEX.,
MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch.
2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012).
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appointment, sanction, and bid, including the development of
specifications, an award grant or contact for more than $2,000.”172
Although seemingly similar, the slight variations may have a substantive
effect. First, unlike the ordinances of El Paso and San Antonio, it does not
expressly include an “impending” matter,173 or in the case of Dallas, a
matter that “may be the subject of action by” the city.174 Arguably, then,
the Austin ordinance may be limited to those proposals that are actually
before the relevant city officials. Additionally, Austin places a minimum
threshold of $2,000 on contracts that would raise a municipal question.175
Again, the City of Houston takes the approach most similar to the state
Lobby Law, which defines two types of matters—municipal legislation and
administrative action.176 Administrative action is defined as “rulemaking,
licensing, or any other matter that may be the subject of action by a city
official, city department[,] or other city agency, including the proposal,
consideration, or approval of the matter.”177 The term excludes day-today matters relating to the application or administration of existing city
programs or policies.178 Municipal legislation, by comparison, is defined
as “an ordinance, resolution, motion, amendment[,] or other matter
pending before the city council” or “[a]ny matter that is or may be the
subject of action by the city council or a council committee, including
drafting, placing on the agenda, consideration, passage, defeat, approval, or
countersignature of the matter.”179
These highly technical distinctions are important because they
determine whether a lawyer advocating at the local level must register as a
lobbyist, and therefore subject himself—and his client—to significantly
more public scrutiny. Determining whether the subject of representation
constitutes a municipal question will dictate whether the attorney must
disclose his client’s identity, the client’s specific goals, the structure of his
professional engagement, the nature of his interactions with local officials,
the fundamental basis of his advocacy strategy, and in some instances, his
172. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(9) (2012).
173. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-62(k) (2012); EL
PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012).
174. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012).
175. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-2(9) (2012).
176. Compare HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012) (providing
definitions for both municipal legislation and administrative action), with TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§ 305.002(1) (West Supp. 2012) (defining administrative action), and id. § 305.002(6) (defining
legislation in the context of lobbying).
177. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-71 (2012).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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compensation.180
E. Reporting
Each ethics ordinance under discussion has specific disclosure
requirements for a local lobbyist’s initial registration as well as for ongoing
activity reports. For attorneys who find themselves subject to a municipal
lobby regulation, these disclosures will likely require more detailed
information than most attorneys are accustomed to providing.
The ordinances of Austin, San Antonio, and Dallas each require new
registrants to identify their client and specify the municipal questions they
seek to influence.181 The ordinances also mandate quarterly disclosure of
any initial contact with city officials and whether the representation is
contingent upon the outcome of the municipal question.182 The
subsequent quarterly activity reports must include the client, the specific
issues subject to the lobby efforts, a list of city officials contacted, all
expenditures made in connection with lobby activities, and a list of all the
registrant’s employees who engaged in lobby activities.183 Additionally,
each activity report must be sworn to.184 It is worth noting that the
Dallas and San Antonio ordinances also require lobbyists who
communicate in writing to include the identity of their client in the
written communication; if having a conversation with a city official, the
lobbyist must orally identify her client to the municipal official.185
The City of Houston requires a lobbyist’s initial registration to include
the client’s identity, the subject of the lobby activity, and whether the
lobbyist’s compensation is partially or totally contingent on the outcome
of the matter.186 Interestingly, Houston does not require the same detail
mandated by other cities in subsequent activity reports—a lobbyist is not
180. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.020 (2012) (defining
lobbying as action taken on a municipal question, which triggers the registration requirement under
section 2.94.040).
181. E.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.5(c) (2012).
182. E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-65(e)
(2012).
183. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-7 (2012); DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch.
12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.6 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div.
V, § 2-66 (2012).
184. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.6 (2012) (“Activity Reports”);
SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-66 (2012) (“Quarterly
Activity Report”).
185. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.9 (2012); SAN ANTONIO, TEX.,
CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art III, div. V, § 2-68 (2012).
186. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-74 (2012).
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required to list the specific contacts with city officials that relate to her
advocacy, but only needs to list expenditures made in the course of
lobbying.187
Only the City of El Paso takes into account the professional restrictions
imposed upon licensed attorneys:
A registrant who is an attorney shall not be required to report under
[the initial registration section or the activity reports section], specific facts or
information that would cause the attorney to violate the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct; provided however, that the ability to exclude
certain privileged or confidential information under the his subsection shall
not constitute nor be interpreted to constitute a complete exception to the
registration or activity reporting requirement for an attorney who is required
to register under this chapter.188

Like the other ordinances analyzed, the El Paso ordinance requires the
initial registration to identify the client and the specific municipal
questions at issue.189 Subsequent activity reports must also name the
client, identify the specific municipal question that was the subject of the
lobby activities, itemize lobby expenditures and gifts made to public
officers, and list the city officials that were contacted on behalf of each
client.190 The question, then, is what information a lawyer–lobbyist may
withhold from his report. Furthermore, what reported information can be
omitted from disclosure under one of the exceptions in the Code? This
issue is discussed further below, but it should be noted that there is
precedent for treating the client’s identity as confidential.191 Further, any
communication between attorney and client is confidential, and that
protection extends to both privileged and unprivileged information.192
Therefore, can the municipal questions of concern to the client be
withheld from public disclosure?

187. Id. § 18-75.
188. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.060(B) (2012).
189. Id. § 2.94.060(A)(3).
190. Id. § 2.94.070.
191. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a), reprinted in TEX.
GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2005) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 9); cf. ALA.
CODE § 36-25-1(20) (LexisNexis Supp. 2012) (attorneys involved in drafting legislation or rendering
opinions regarding the effects of registration are not considered lobbyists); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 24-6-101 (2012) (lobbying does not include attorney–client communications that involve the
practice the law); D.C. CODE § 1-1161.01(32)(B) (2012) (representation by an attorney of a client
before an executive agency hearing is not lobbying); N.Y. LEGIS. LAW § 1-c (Consol. Supp. 2012)
(participation of an attorney on behalf of a client in a public proceeding is not deemed lobbying).
192. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a).
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F. Contingent Fees and Procurement Issues
At the state level, the issue of advocating on a contingent fee basis is
deceptively straightforward. The Texas Government Code generally
prohibits lobbying on a contingent fee basis193 and provides that a
violation of the prohibition constitutes a third degree felony.194 In fact,
the law creates two offenses: first, it is unlawful for the client to “retain or
employ another person to influence legislation or administrative action for
compensation that is totally or partially contingent on the passage or defeat
of any legislation, the governor’s approval or veto of any legislation, or the
outcome of any administrative action”;195 and second, it is unlawful for a
person (regardless of status as a registered lobbyist) to accept such
employment.196
However, the statute establishes exceptions to the general prohibition,
which are largely intended to address the sale of goods to state agencies.
For example, the statute excludes a sales commission payable to “an
employee of a vendor of a product or service” so long as the state agency
purchasing decision does not exceed $10 million.197 Similarly, a quarterly
or annual compensation performance bonus payable to a vendor’s
employee is not considered an impermissible contingent fee.198 Note,
these two exceptions apply specifically to an employee199 of a vendor;
however, an independent contractor who sells a product or service may
avoid the contingency fee prohibition only if the purchasing decision does
not exceed $10 million and the contractor registers as a lobbyist (noting
the vendor as the lobby client).200 The prohibition does not apply to
contingency fees “expressly authorized by other law” or for legal
representation before state administrative agencies in contested hearings or
in other similarly adversarial proceedings.201 The prohibition and its
exceptions appear designed to prevent contingent-fee lobbying, while
simultaneously recognizing traditional compensation for the sale of goods
and thereby discouraging attempts by consultants to avoid registration by
masquerading as a salesperson.
193. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.022 (West Supp. 2012).
194. Id. § 305.031(b) (West 2005).
195. Id. § 305.022(a) (West Supp. 2012).
196. Id. § 305.022(b).
197. Id. § 305.022(c)(1).
198. Id. § 305.022(c)(2).
199. See id. § 305.022(e) (defining employee as a full-time employee, as opposed to a
consultant or independent contractor).
200. Id. § 305.022(c)(1).
201. Id. § 305.022(d).
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The issue of contingent-fee lobbying and its connection to the
procurement process is approached differently by the various Texas cities
discussed in this Article. Some cities prohibit contingent-fee lobbying,202
while others simply mandate that such an arrangement must be
disclosed.203 Similarly, the cities take varying approaches to the role of
the lobbyist in procurement matters, though most try to limit advocacy
while a proposal is out for bid.204 Consequently, a local lobbyist may be
hired to help secure a municipal contract, but subsequently be barred from
advocating during the period when the recommendations and decisions are
made.
The City of Dallas authorizes the practice of lobbying on a contingent
fee basis, but requires the arrangement to be reported on registration and
activity reports.205 The Dallas lobby ordinance also includes, under the
section entitled “Restricted Activities,” a prohibition against “[l]obbying by
bidders and proposers on city contracts.”206 The ordinance states:
A person responding to a request for bids or request for proposals on a city
contract shall not (either personally or through a representative, employee, or
agent) lobby a city council member from the time the advertisement or
public notification of the request for bids or request for proposals is made
until the time the contract is awarded by the city council.207

Like Dallas, the City of San Antonio permits lobbying on a contingent
fee basis, but requires the disclosure of such an arrangement.208 San
Antonio has an additional provision that requires anyone seeking a
discretionary contract from the city to disclose certain information,
including the “identity of any lobbyist, attorney[,] or consultant employed
for purposes relating to the discretionary contract being sought by any
individual or entity who would be a party to the discretionary
contract.”209 After a bid for a contract with the city is released, a person
acting on a bidder’s behalf is prohibited from contacting city officials or
202. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-8(C) (2012).
203. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.2(12) (2012) (mandating the
declaration of a contingent fee agreement); SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art
III, div. V, § 2-66(e) (2012) (requiring disclosure of a contingent fee arrangement).
204. E.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.090(E) (2012) (“During the
period in which the city has issued a solicitation, including a competitive bid, . . . no person or
registrant shall engage in any lobbying with city officials or employees.”).
205. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.5(c)(4) & 15.6(a)(3) (2012).
206. Id. § 12A-15.8(g).
207. Id.
208. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-66(e) (2012).
209. Id. § 2-59(a)(3).
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employees (with the exception of the city employees specified in the
solicitation document) regarding that contract until the item has been
posted on the city council’s agenda for consideration.210 A violation may
disqualify the offer from consideration.211
The City of Houston does not prohibit lobbying on a contingent fee
basis, but requires a registrant to disclose “[w]hether the registrant’s
compensation, if any, is totally or partially contingent on the passage or
defeat of any municipal legislation or the outcome of any administrative
action.”212
The City of Austin’s ordinance contains an outright prohibition on
contingent fees.213 Like the state law, the prohibition applies to both the
client and the advocate, providing, “No person shall retain or accept
employment to lobby on a contingent fee basis.”214 However, the
ordinance does contain an exception for situations where “a contingent fee
is a standard and customary method of payment for the employment of
the person.”215 Though not part of its lobby ordinance, the City of
Austin also establishes an “anti-lobbying” policy relating to the city’s
procurement procedures.216 The ordinance provides that from the time a
solicitation is issued until a contract for that project is executed, a bidder or
the bidder’s agent—including a local lobbyist—may not contact any city
official, other than the official designated in the solicitation documents,
about the matter.217 Although the ordinance expressly waives any
criminal penalty for a violation, there are still potentially serious
consequences for the bidder or vendor, including disqualification from the
solicitation and any similar subsequent solicitations. A vendor who is
found to have violated the no-contact provision twice during a five-year
period will, after notice and a hearing, be barred from all city solicitations
for a period of up to three years.218 If it is determined that the contractor
violated the no-contact provision after the execution of a contract, the
contract is voidable at the discretion of the city. So, not only must a local
lobbyist report all contacts with city officials during the course of her lobby
activity, but that person must also be scrupulous enough to know when
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Id. § 2-61.
Id.
HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-74(a)(5) (2012).
AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-8(c) (2012).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See id. tit. 2, ch. 2-7, §§ 2-7-101 to 110.
Id.
EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.130 (2012).
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those contacts are prohibited by the procurement process, lest the client be
disqualified and barred from business with the city.
The City of El Paso does not prohibit lobbying on a contingent fee
basis, and expressly includes such an arrangement as a trigger for
registration.219 El Paso’s lobby ordinance also addresses the issue of
contact during a procurement period. During the period between the
issuance of a solicitation and the official notice of the contract award, “no
person or registrant shall engage in any lobbying activities with city
officials and employees.”220 Any person or entity found to violate this
provision may be disqualified by the city council from entering into any
contract with the city for up to three years.221
G. Treatment of Attorneys
The cities discussed herein take differing approaches to attorneys acting
as lobbyists; the recurring theme, however, is to treat lawyers as any other
paid advocate and to carve as narrow an exception as possible.222 Most
ordinances attempt to establish a distinction between lobby work and legal
work.223 That is, any distinctions between lawyers and nonlawyers are
based on conduct rather than professional status. As discussed later,
however, making a theoretical distinction practicably workable will likely
prove difficult.
The cities of Dallas and San Antonio built in limited exceptions to the
definition of lobbyist that expressly mention licensed lawyers.224 Dallas
lists among its exceptions to registration: “An attorney or other person
whose contact with a city official is made solely as part of resolving a
dispute with the city, provided that the contact is solely with city officials
who do not vote on or have final authority over any municipal question
involved.”225 The City of San Antonio takes a similar approach, but it
references the relevant ethics rule governing attorney communications and
exempts:
219. Id. § 2.94.040(A)(6).
220. Id. § 2.94.090(E).
221. Id. § 2.94.130.
222. Compare DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art III-A, § 12A-15.4(5) (2012) (mentioning
an attorney exception), with AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-5(7) (2012) (neglecting
to specifically mention attorneys in the exception).
223. See, e.g., EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.050(F) (2012) (recognizing
exception for attorneys doing legal work).
224. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.4(5) (2012); SAN ANTONIO,
TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(5) (2012).
225. DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-15.4(5) (2012).
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An attorney or other person whose contact with a city official is made solely
as part of resolving a dispute with the city, provided that the contact is solely
with city officials who do not vote on or have final authority over any
municipal question involved and so long as such an attorney complies with Rule
4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended.226

As will be discussed later, compliance with Rule 4.02 is a significant issue
for a lawyer–lobbyist to overcome, and one that potentially puts a lawyer
at a strategic disadvantage.
The City of Austin, though making no mention of attorneys, also
incorporates a dispute resolution exception, providing that “a person”
whose sole contact is made for the purpose of resolving a dispute with the
city need not register as a lobbyist.227
The City of El Paso incorporates a slightly modified exception aimed
specifically at attorneys that relieves the registration requirement:
A person who is performing an act that may be performed only by a
licensed attorney or a person whose contact with a city official is made solely
as part of the process of resolution of a dispute or other matter that is
primarily legal in nature between a person and the city if the person is an
attorney, so long as he complies with Rule 4.02 of the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct, as amended.228

The Houston City Council’s relatively recent changes to its lobby
ordinance provide an interesting look at how the treatment of attorneys
can be central to the policymaking process. Changes adopted by the
Houston City Council in 2011 were designed specifically to make sure
attorneys were clearly within the scope of the lobby ordinance and its
disclosure requirements.229 Consider this question posed by the Houston
Chronicle’s editorial board: “When is a lobbyist not a lobbyist at Houston
City Hall? Answer: When he or she is a lawyer influencing elected officials
under the guise of performing legal work.”230 At the time, Houston
Mayor Annise Parker stated, “For whatever reason, lawyers did not want to
register as lobbyists even though they were doing exactly the same work. I

226. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(5) (2012)
(emphasis added).
227. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-5(7) (2012).
228. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.050(F) (2012) (emphasis added).
229. See Editorial, Lobby Law: City Ordinance Aims to Unmask Attorneys Working to Influence
Councilmembers, HOUS. CHRON. (Jan. 8, 2011), http://www.chron.com/opinion/editorials/article/
Lobby-law-City-ordinance-aims-to-unmask-1692660.php (citing Houston council members stating
an intention to include attorneys within scope of lobby ordinance).
230. Id.
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see no distinction, and if you’re lobbying, you’re lobbying.”231 Attorneys
representing companies or individuals discussed matters with council
members, though the attorneys rarely registered as lobbyists, defended
themselves by explaining they were acting “on behalf of a legal client.”232
Consequently, the lobby ordinance was amended and now provides
limited exceptions similar to other cities’ municipal lobby ordinances. The
ordinance provides that a person who is otherwise required to register who
communicates directly with a member of the executive branch is not
required to register if “performing an act that may be performed only by a
licensed attorney.”233
H. Counties
It is worth noting that two large Texas counties, Harris County and El
Paso County, have ventured into the area of lobby regulations. The likely
explanation for the dearth of counties considering such rules is the lack of
statutory authority. It is well settled that Texas counties are limited to the
power expressly conferred on them by the Texas Legislature.234 To date,
the legislature has not granted counties blanket authority to regulate the
practice of lobbying at the local level.
The two counties, at opposite ends of the state, have taken drastically
different approaches to the regulation of local lobbying. In 2009, Harris
County adopted a policy for the voluntary registration of local lobbyists
seeking to influence county business:
Although the State of Texas, the City of Houston, and other Texas
jurisdictions require registration and disclosure of lobbying activities, Harris
County [cannot] do so without enabling legislation. The county can,
however, seek voluntary annual registration and financial disclosure showing
clients represented and specific lobbying topics from any person or entity
that expends or receives compensation of $200 or more for lobbying
activities.235

Currently, only eight individuals representing seven clients have
231. Id.
232. Bradley Olson, Houston City Leaders Look to Tighten Ethics, Lobbying Rules, HOUS.
CHRON. (Jan. 5, 2011), http://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/article/Houston-city-leaderslook-to-tighten-ethics-1609644.php.
233. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18–72(b)(1) (2012).
234. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., 2009 COUNTIES AND DUTIES
HANDBOOK (2009), available at https://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/copowers
duties.pdf (recognizing the legislature has the power to modify the powers of Texas counties).
235. HARRIS CNTY. ETHICS POLICY 3 (2009), available at http://www.harriscountytx.gov/
CmpDocuments/63/Doc/Ethics%20Policy.pdf.
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voluntarily registered as Harris County lobbyists.236
El Paso County, recognizing the lack of statutory authority, sought and
received its own enabling legislation for a code of ethics,237 including its
own ethics commission and lobby regulations. The resulting regulatory
framework is generally comparable to the municipal ordinances covered
herein. El Paso County has adopted an expansive definition of “county
public servant” that includes all elected county officials, candidates for
county office, the county auditor, the county purchasing agent, all county
employees, all assistant district attorneys, and appointed members of
county and multi-jurisdictional boards.238 The Code of Ethics adopts a
standard definition of lobbyist that excludes “[a]n attorney who
communicates directly with a county public servant to the extent that such
communication relates to the attorney’s representation of a party in a civil
or criminal proceeding.”239 The enabling statute provides the definition
of lobbyist, but authorizes the county ethics commission to adopt the
appropriate compensation threshold, directing the commission to look to
the rules of the Texas Ethics Commission, adopted pursuant to the state
Lobby Law, for guidance.240
Interestingly, the only criminal offenses created by El Paso County’s
enabling legislation relate to the breach of the commission’s sworn
complaint process.241
Unauthorized destruction or removal of
confidential information may result in a fine between $25 and $4,000, as
236. See Stan Stanart, Summary of Registered Lobbyists in Harris County, HARRIS COUNTY
CLERK’S OFFICE: ETHICS SYSTEM, http://www.ethics.cclerk.hctx.net/LobbyistRegistartion/
LobbyBrowse.aspx (last visited Mar. 25, 2013) (providing a current list of all voluntarily registered
lobbyists in Harris County).
237. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 161.101 (West Supp. 2012) (“The commission shall
enforce the provisions of the ethics code by issuing appropriate orders or recommendations or by
imposing appropriate penalties.”). See generally EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 4 (2012),
available at http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (creating a
detailed code of ethics regarding the procedures and regulations for lobbyists).
238. See EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 2.2 (2012), available at
http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (listing explicit definitions for
county public servant, county officer, and county employee).
239. See id. § 2.8 (“Lobbyist means a person who, receives, or is entitled to receive under an
agreement under which the person is retained or employed . . . .”).
240. See LOC. GOV’T § 161.101 (citing the general powers of the county ethics commission).
241. See id. § 161.173(d)–(h) (West Supp. 2012) (“A person who obtains access to confidential
information under this chapter commits an offense if that person knowingly: (1) uses the confidential
information for the purpose other than the purpose for which the information was received or for a
purpose unrelated to this chapter, including solicitation of political contributions or solicitation of
clients; (2) permits inspection of the confidential information by a person who is not authorized to
inspect the information; or (3) discloses the confidential information to a person who is not
authorized to receive the information.”).
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well as confinement anywhere from three days to three months.242
Unauthorized disclosure, distribution, or use of confidential information
subject to the sworn complaint process is punishable by a fine up to
$1,000 and confinement in the county jail for up to six months.243 Such
a breach constitutes official misconduct, subjects an employee to discipline
or termination, and justifies referral to the district attorney for behavior
constituting a violation of the Penal Code.244
In considering an actual violation of the Code of Ethics, the El Paso
Ethics Commission may issue “a cease and desist order,” which is “an
affirmative order to require compliance with the law[],” and “an order of
public censure with or without a civil penalty.”245 The civil penalty may
be up to $4,000 for violating the Code of Ethics, or up to $500 for delayed
compliance with a commission order.246
In contrast to municipal lobby ordinances, which create a Class C
misdemeanor for violating their terms, the legislation enabling El Paso
County’s regulatory process does not create a crime for violating its
standards; it criminalizes the release of information relating to an
investigation of those violations.247 In other words, a private attorney
who fails to properly register or report as a lobbyist may face a reprimand
or civil penalty, but the public attorney conducting the investigation of
such behavior faces imprisonment for improperly disclosing information
about the investigation.

242. See id. § 161.173(e) (explicating the confidentiality requirements associated with the
commission and the commission staff); EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 17.3 (2012),
available at http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (“A person
commits an offense if the person intentionally: destroys, mutilates, or alters information obtained
under this chapter; or removes information obtained under this chapter without permission as
provided by this chapter.”).
243. LOC. GOV’T § 161.173(h) (West Supp. 2012).
244. See EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS §§ 17.3.2, 17.3.3 (2012), available at
http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (“Violation of this [a]rticle is a
misdemeanor and is punishable by fine and/or confinement in the [county jail]pursuant to Section
161.173 of the Local Government Code.”).
245. See LOC. GOV’T § 161.201 (West Supp. 2012) (explaining the enforcement capabilities of
the commission).
246. See id. § 161.202 (describing the civil penalties for delay or violation of a commission
order).
247. See EL PASO CNTY., TEX., CODE OF ETHICS § 17.2.1 (2012), available at
http://www.epcounty.com/ethicscom/documents/Code_of_Ethics.pdf (“A person who obtains access
to confidential information under this chapter commits an offense if that person knowingly: uses the
confidential information for a purpose other than the purpose for which the information was received
or for a purpose unrelated to this chapter . . . .”).
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IV. PRACTICAL ISSUES FACING ATTORNEYS
The attorney interacting with government should be mindful of the
various ways by which the lobby ordinances, rules, and statutes referenced
above can create practical issues influencing advocacy at the local or state
level.
A. Engagement Structure
Even the formation of the attorney–client relationship, including the
responsibilities of the lawyer and the structure of the fee arrangement, can
have implications depending on the jurisdiction. As mentioned above,
some local lobby ordinances—notably, those in San Antonio and Dallas—
look to the division of both duties and fees, as well as to the intent of the
parties crafting the terms of engagement.248 If an attorney’s engagement
includes both legal and local lobby services, the attorney should be mindful
of the relevant distinctions when crafting the scope of the lawyer’s
responsibilities. If the representation involves legislative advocacy, the
attorney may want to specify that disclosure of the client’s identity is likely
to occur, regardless of the constraints envisioned by Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.05.249 Similarly, the subject matter
of the representation will likely have to be disclosed, as well as many of the
efforts undertaken on the client’s behalf.250 Likewise, the nature of the
fee arrangement may have to be disclosed depending on the
jurisdiction.251 A client seeking a contingent fee arrangement should be
advised as to whether such an agreement is permissible, and if so, whether
it must be publicly disclosed.252
The exceptions previously noted in Chapter 305 of the Texas
Government Code allow an attorney to avoid registration only in limited
situations, primarily those that already require the disclosure of the client
248. E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, §§ 2-62 to
271 (2012) (explicating the San Antonio Code of Ordinance’s requirements for lobbyists, including
attorneys).
249. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05(a)–(c) (“A lawyer may reveal
confidential information: (1) When the lawyer has been expressly authorized to do so in order to
carry out the representation. (2) When the client consents after consultation.”).
250. See id. R. 1.05 cmt. 1 (urging the importance of full disclosure to the client prior to
representation).
251. Cf. id. R. 1.05 cmt. 15 (“A lawyer entitled to a fee necessarily must be permitted to prove
the services rendered in an action to collect it, and this necessity is recognized by sub-paragraphs
(c)(5) and (d)(2)(iv). This aspect of the rule, in regard to privileged information, expresses the
principle that the beneficiary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit the relationship to the
detriment of the fiduciary.”).
252. See id. R. 1.04 (d) (detailing the requirements of attorney contingency fees).
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relationship, such as administrative or legislative hearings and contested
case hearings.253 In general, there is no broad exception for an attorney to
utilize to maintain the confidentiality of the relationship or the details it
encompasses.
B. What Can Only Be Done by an Attorney?
The local ordinances discussed above all recognize that there are certain
functions that only licensed attorneys may perform and should not fall
within the standard definition of lobbying. However, none of the
ordinances discussed above even attempts to provide any guidance as to the
conduct that falls within this exception. To discern what conduct can only
rightly be engaged in by a licensed lawyer, practitioners must turn
elsewhere.
Somewhat surprisingly, neither the Texas Disciplinary Rules of
Professional Conduct nor the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure
attempt to define the practice of law. However, the state law governing
the regulation of the legal profession (and the unauthorized practice of
law) does offer some guidance.254 That statute defines the practice of law
as:
[T]he preparation of a pleading or other document incident to an action or
special proceeding or the management of the action or proceeding on behalf
of a client before a judge in court as well as a service rendered out of court,
including the giving of advice or the rendering of any service requiring the
use of legal skill or knowledge, such as preparing a will, contract, or other
instrument, the legal effect of which under the facts and conclusions
involved must be carefully determined.255

So, in the context of advocating on a client’s behalf at city hall, what
constitutes legal work? Is the drafting of an ordinance something that only
a licensed lawyer should do? What about opining on the legal implications
of a proposed city policy? In case the definition set forth in section
81.101(a) of the Texas Government Code does not provide enough
253. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003(b-1) (West 2012) (“Subsection (a)(2) does not
require a member of the judicial, legislative, or executive branch of state government or an officer or
employee of a political subdivision of the state to register.”).
254. See id. § 81.101 (West 2005) (providing governance for the practice of law and
unauthorized practice of law).
255. See id. § 81.101(a)–(c) (“In this chapter, the ‘practice of law’ does not include the design,
creation, publication, distribution, display, or sale, including publication, distribution, display, or sale
by means of an Internet web site, of written materials, books, forms, computer software, or similar
products if the products clearly and conspicuously state that the products are not a substitute for the
advice of an attorney.”).
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certainty, beware of section 81.101(b): “The definition in this section is
not exclusive and does not deprive the judicial branch of the power and
authority under both this chapter and the adjudicated cases to determine
whether other services and acts not enumerated may constitute the practice
of law.”256
Thus, according to the Government Code, a person must be a lawyer to
prepare a pleading or other document on behalf of a client in court, to
render legal advice out of court, to prepare instruments requiring legal
consideration, or to engage in any other quasi-legal conduct that some
court may find to be overreaching at some later date.257 Compare that
ambiguous guidance with the Texas Penal Code provision covering the
unauthorized practice of law,258 which makes it a Class A misdemeanor
for a person, “with intent to obtain an economic benefit for himself or
herself,” to do any of the following:
(1) contract[] with any person to represent that person with regard to
personal causes of action for property damages or personal injury;
(2) advise[] any person as to the person’s rights and the advisability of
making claims for personal injuries or property damages;
(3) advise[] any person as to whether or not to accept an offered sum of
money in settlement of claims for personal injuries or property damages;
(4) enter[] into a contract with another person to represent that person . . .
on a contingent fee basis [;] or
(5) enter[] into any contract with a third person which purports to grant the
exclusive right to select and retain legal counsel . . . in any legal
proceeding.259

The prohibitions above do not apply to a person currently licensed to
practice law in Texas or another jurisdiction.260
While the Texas Government Code establishes the practice of law as the
rendering of specialized legal services, the Texas Penal Code establishes the
unauthorized practice of law as an attempt to enrich oneself in the realm of

256. Id. § 81.101(b).
257. See id. (granting the judiciary the ability to ascertain what does and does not constitute the
practice of law).
258. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.123 (West 2011) (including a graduated punishment
system for repeat offenders, such as “under Subsection (a) of this section is a felony of the third
degree if it is shown on the trial of the offense that the defendant has previously been convicted under
Subsection (a) of this section”).
259. See id. § 38.123(a) (describing the elements that constitute the “Unauthorized Practice of
Law” in Texas).
260. See id. § 38.123(b) (stating that such provision in the Texas Penal Code does not apply to
any attorney in good standing with the State Bar of Texas or other valid jurisdiction).
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personal injury and property claims.261 Unfortunately, neither provision
provides any meaningful guidance when attempting to determine whether
an individual is “performing an act that may be performed only by a
licensed attorney.”262
V. ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES FACING ATTORNEYS
A. State Bar Consequences
In terms of reconciling state and local lobby regulations with an
attorney’s ethical obligations, even the disclosure of a client’s identity is
potentially problematic.
Rule 1.05 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct sets
forth the guidelines for confidential and privileged information.263
Confidential information not only includes privileged information264 but
also unprivileged client information.265
In 1991, the Professional Ethics Committee for the State Bar of Texas
considered whether the Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct
prevented an attorney from disclosing a client’s name and the fees owed by
that client.266 The Committee looked at the then recently enacted
expansion of the confidentiality rule, which clarified that both privileged
and unprivileged client information were deemed confidential.267 The
Committee also looked at the restrictions imposed by the law of agency on
261. See id. § 38.123(a) (establishing the circumstances under which a person will be guilty of
engaging in the unauthorized practice of law and focusing on personal injury and property disputes).
262. E.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(9)
(2012) (asserting the attorney exception included in the list of persons who are not required to
register as lobbyists).
263. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (dictating Texas guidelines
and limitations on a client’s confidential information).
264. Id. R. 1.05(a) (identifying two types of confidential information and providing that
“‘[p]rivileged information’ refers to the information of a client protected by the lawyer–client
privilege of Rule 503 of the Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence or . . . Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence”).
265. Id. R. 1.05(a) (including information acquired by a lawyer relating to or “furnished by the
client other than privileged information” (emphasis added)).
266. See Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (addressing “whether the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct prohibit the disclosure of” client names or “the amounts
owed by each client” where the information is requested from the firm to secure a loan); see also TEX.
DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 cmt. 15 (“A lawyer entitled to a fee necessarily
must be permitted to prove the services rendered in an action to collect it.”).
267. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (providing privileged and
unprivileged information are appropriately categorized as confidential information); See also Tex.
Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (“In contrast to the former rule . . . [Disciplinary Rule
1.05] provides increased protection by expanding the scope of confidentiality.”).
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an attorney acting “in his or her capacity as fiduciary.”268 In its analysis,
the Committee found that the names of a client and the amounts they
owed constituted confidential information.269 In conclusion, “[a]bsent a
client’s informed consent, [a] law firm may not reveal either the names of
its client or the amounts which those clients owe.”270
In light of this cautionary guidance, an attorney should approach
governmental advocacy with care. When it becomes clear to attorneys that
they will be subject to a local lobby ordinance or the state Lobby Law,
should the first order of business be to gain consent to disclose the client’s
identity? Similarly, if the professional ethics committee has deemed it
improper to disclose amounts owed by a client to an attorney, does that
same logic apply to the disclosure of a contingent fee arrangement? A
careful practitioner should not only get consent to reveal the client’s
identity, but also seek permission to reveal any relevant details of the fee
structure.271 Otherwise, the advocate’s first act of compliance—
registering as a lobbyist—could simultaneously constitute an ethical
breach.272
B. Rule 4.02: Communications with One Represented by Counsel
One of the more complicated and uncharted ethical consequences
stemming from local lobby ordinances is the issue of reconciling how
communication with city officials is treated by local ordinance and how it
is viewed by the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct.273
There appears to be an inherent conflict between a regulatory structure
that regulates such communication through disclosure and a system that
essentially prohibits such communication.
268. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (“[A] lawyer’s obligation of
confidentiality springs not so much from the attorney–client evidentiary privilege as it does from the
Law of Agency.”).
269. See id. (“Application of the rule prohibits the law firm from disclosing the requested
information.”).
270. Id.
271. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.05 (prohibiting the disclosure of
confidential information and providing for limited exceptions to the rule); Tex. Comm. on Prof'l
Ethics, Op. No. 479 (1991) (“Absent a client’s informed consent, the law firm may not reveal either
the names of its clients or the amounts which those clients owe.”).
272. See generally TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.003 (West 2005) (outlining who is required
to register as a lobbyist).
273. Compare TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02 (stating a lawyer must
not communicate with an entity of government that the lawyer knows is represented by counsel
about his client’s representation), with Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 474 (1991)
(concluding Rule 4.02 prohibited plaintiff’s counsel from communicating with city council
members).
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Rule 4.02 is “meant ‘to prevent lawyers from taking advantage of
uncounselled lay persons and to preserve the integrity of the lawyer–client
relationship.’”274 Rule 4.02 states in relevant part:
(a) In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate or cause or
encourage another to communicate about the subject of the representation
with a person, organization or entity of government the lawyer knows to be
represented by another lawyer regarding that subject, unless the lawyer has
the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized by law to do so.
(b) In representing a client a lawyer shall not communicate or cause another
to communicate about the subject of representation with a person or
organization a lawyer knows to be employed or retained for the purpose of
conferring with or advising another lawyer about the subject of the
representation, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is
authorized by law to do so.
(c) For the purpose of this rule, “organization or entity of government”
includes: (1) those persons presently having a managerial responsibility with
an organization or entity of government that relates to the subject of the
representation, or (2) those persons presently employed by such organization
or entity and whose act or omission in connection with the subject of
representation may make the organization or entity of government
vicariously liable for such act or omission.275

In 1991, the Professional Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas
found Rule 4.02 prohibits a lawyer representing a party in litigation
against a city from communicating with an individual city council member
about the proposed settlement of the litigation.276
Most Texas case law interpreting Rule 4.02 deals with communications
made while litigation was pending and does little to illuminate the
propriety of communications between private attorneys and city officials
regarding matters of public policy.277 The language of the rule and the
274. Graham v. United States, 96 F.3d 446, 449 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. (1992)); see also TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R.
4.02 cmt. 1 (“Paragraph (a) of this Rule is directed at efforts to circumvent the lawyer–client
relationship existing between other persons, organizations[,] or entities of government and their
respective counsel.”); Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 474 (1991) (establishing Rule 4.02
“prohibit[s] communication by a lawyer for one party concerning the subject of the representation
with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the organization that relates to the
subject matter of the representation”).
275. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02.
276. Tex. Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. No. 474 (1991).
277. See, e.g., In re News Am. Pub., Inc., 974 S.W.2d 97, 97 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998,
no pet.) (finding sanctions were appropriate under Rule 4.02 for actions in a suit for breach of
contract where plaintiff’s counsel met with a party who unilaterally terminated his attorney–client
relationship).
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commentary that follows makes it clear that an attorney may communicate
with one represented by counsel about the subject of the representation
only in limited situations: when opposing counsel consents to the
communication or when authorized to do so by law.278
With the exception of San Antonio, which expressly incorporates Rule
4.02 into its lobby regulations,279 the other local lobby ordinances do not
require the consent of the city attorney and clearly anticipate a lawyer–
lobbyist communicating with city officials.280 Thus, does a local lobby
ordinance constitute an authorization by law for the purposes of Rule
4.02? While no formal answer exists, we may be able to glean guidance
from other sources.
The Texas Attorney General considered Rule 4.02 in light of an
administrative rule requiring written communications be delivered to an
opposing party, as well as the party’s counsel.281 The attorney general was
asked about the interplay of Rule 4.02 and a rule adopted by the Texas
Workers’ Compensation Commission, which requires all written
communications relating to a claim be delivered to the claimant’s legal
counsel, as well as the claimant.282 The attorney general sought to
determine whether the commission rule, found in the Texas
Administrative Code, was a “law” that would authorize such
communication.283 The opinion concluded an administrative rule is a
law, provided it is authorized by statute, is within the authority of the
agency, and was adopted in a procedurally correct manner.284
278. See TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.02(a) (restricting contact between
an attorney and opposing counsel’s client to instances where consent is secured from opposing
counsel or the contact is otherwise authorized).
279. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-64(5) (2012)
(stating “[a]n attorney . . . whose contact with a city official is made solely as part of resolving a
dispute with the city, provided that the contact is solely with city officials who do not vote on or have
final authority . . . and so long as such an attorney complies with Rule 4.02,” does not have to
register).
280. See, e.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72(b) (2012)
(establishing an individual that is required to register and “communicates directly with a member of
the executive branch to influence administrative action is not required to register” if the individual
performs acts as a licensed attorney).
281. See Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No. JC0572 (2002) (addressing “whether a Workers’
Compensation Commission . . . rule requiring that written communications be sent to both a
claimant and the claimant’s attorney creates an exception to Rule 4.02(a)”).
282. See id. (comparing Rule 4.02(a) with Workers’ Compensation Commission Rule
102.4(b), which requires certain information be mailed to the claimant and her representative).
283. See id. (“Rule 4.02(a) bars communication with clients ‘unless the lawyer . . . is authorized
by law to do so.’”).
284. Id. (“[A]dministrative regulations only have the full force and effect of law when: (1) a
statute exists which authorized the issuance of rules and regulations by the agency; (2) the rule or
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Additionally, the attorney general opined “that the Commission rule is [a]
‘law’ authorizing an attorney to send a written communication to a person
who is represented by counsel and that it provides an exception to Rule
4.02(a).”285
In reaching this opinion, the attorney general relied on the reasoning set
forth in Lee v. Fenwick,286 which dealt with the proper calculation of
prejudgment interest.287 The issue before the court was whether the
defendant received written notice of the claim, as required by statute, when
plaintiff’s counsel had merely notified defendant’s attorney, but not the
defendant himself.288 The court dispensed with the argument that Rule
4.02 prohibits direct communication with a defendant represented by
counsel.289 The court focused on the exception created by the language in
Rule 4.02, noting that the general prohibition applies “unless the lawyer . . .
is authorized by law to do so,” and concluded, “Since [the statute] requires
written notice to the defendant, an attorney would not violate Disciplinary
Rule 4.02 by sending the statutory notice.”290
However, these authorities deal with situations where an attorney is
procedurally required to communicate in writing with another party, not
with the sort of strategic oral communication most often associated with
lobbying. The local lobby ordinances do not require communication, but
merely permit communication and mandate that it be disclosed.291
Clearly, an ordinance regulating lobbyists is within the lawful jurisdiction
of a home rule municipality and should be considered a law complete with
criminal penalties.292 The question that remains unanswered is whether a
regulation adopted is within the authority of the agency; and (3) the rule or regulation is adopted
according to the procedure prescribed by statute.”).
285. Id.
286. Lee v. Fenwick, 907 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. App.—Eastland 1995, writ denied).
287. Compare id. at 88 (discussing whether the defendant received communications from the
plaintiff about the claim before suit was filed and awarding “prejudgment interest from the date the
lawsuit was filed,” because the defendant did not receive notice), with Tex. Att’y Gen. Op. No.
JC0572 (2002) (relying on the decision in Lee v. Fenwick to conclude that a statutory exception
exists to Rule 4.02).
288. Lee, 907 S.W.2d at 89–90 (examining the argument that receipt of notice by a party’s
counsel is conclusive of the fact that the party received notice).
289. See id. at 90 (dismissing the plaintiff’s argument by noting that an exemption to Rule 4.02
exists where there is a statutory notice requirement).
290. Id.
291. See, e.g., HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-72 (2012) (discussing
registration when a party makes certain communications, but not mandating the party make
communications).
292. See, e.g., id. (establishing reporting requirements for lobbyists conducting communications
in the City of Houston).
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local lobby ordinance that grants restricted permission to communicate
with city officials outside the presence of their attorneys is legal
authorization, which brings those discussions outside the scope of Rule
4.02.
C. Regulating Conflicts of Interest
As noted, state Lobby Law contains statutory provisions for lobbyists
whose clients develop conflicting interests.293 These restrictions are in
addition to—not in lieu of—the conflict of interest rules governing
attorneys.294 This means a lawyer who is lobbying at the state level is
equally subject to both standards for conflicts of interests, each with its
own method of addressing the conflict. Although the lobby conflicts
provisions of the Government Code have not yet made their way into local
lobby ordinances, practitioners should be aware of the two systems and
their distinctions. The two procedures differ in the notice required,295 the
disclosure of a conflict,296 and the ability of the clients to consent to a
conflict of interest.297
Rule 1.06 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules governs conflicts of interests
between clients.298 Generally, a lawyer may not represent a client if it
reasonably appears the client’s interests are materially and directly adverse
to the interests of another client or to the lawyer himself.299 A lawyer may
engage in the dual representation if the lawyer reasonably believes the dual
representation will not materially affect either client and after full
disclosure of the conflict—and its potential consequences—each client
consents to the dual representation.300 If the conflict is incurable, the
lawyer should withdraw from one or more representations as necessary to
293. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 305.028 (West 2005) (identifying prohibited conflicts of
interest under the state Lobby Law).
294. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 (providing the general rule for
conflicts of interest).
295. Compare GOV’T § 305.028(c)(2) (describing the requirement to file conflicts with the
Commission), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06 (omitting notice to
anyone other than each affected client).
296. Compare GOV’T § 305.028(c)(2) (requiring client disclosure within two business days of
discovering the conflict), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06(c)(2)
(detailing the required disclosure of the conflict to the client).
297. Compare GOV’T § 305.028(c-1)(2) (allowing an attorney to represent a client despite a
conflict of interest if the attorney does not “reasonably believe[] the representation of each client will
be materially affected” and if the client consents), with TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.06(c) (requiring the consent of “each affected or potentially affected client”).
298. TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.06.
299. Id. R. 1.06(b).
300. Id. R. 1.06(c).
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avoid a violation of the rules.
The Lobby Law borrows liberally from Rule 1.06, but specifies written
notice to affected clients and requires disclosure of the conflict to a third
party. Section 305.028 of the Government Code sets out the conflict of
interest provisions applicable to lobbyists.301 It provides that a lobbyist
may not represent two clients with interests that are “materially and
directly adverse,” nor may he represent a client when the representation
“reasonably appears to be adversely limited” by the lobbyist’s own interests
or obligation to another client.302 To properly address a conflict, the
lobbyist must reasonably believe “the representation of each client will not
be materially affected,” must notify each client in writing within two
business days of becoming aware of the conflict, and must provide written
notice to the Texas Ethics Commission of the existence of the conflict
within ten days.303 Once this notice is accomplished, there is no
permission necessary from the clients to continue the representation.304
However, if the lobbyist determines that the dual representation
reasonably appears to materially affect the representation, both clients must
consent to the continuing lobby representation, thereby waiving the
lobbyist’s conflict.305 When a conflict arises that the procedures in the
statute do not satisfactorily address, the lobbyist must withdraw from
representation as necessary to cure the conflict.306 Violations are subject
to civil penalty and revocation of lobby credentials by the Ethics
Commission, and lobbyists are under an ongoing obligation to swear they
have complied with Section 305.028.307
D. Penal Code Consequences
As noted earlier, one of the statutory exceptions to the Texas Penal
Code’s gift prohibition is for food, lodging, transportation, and
entertainment that is both (1) accepted as a guest, and (2) reported as
required by law.308 In order to take advantage of this exception, both the
donor and donee must meet relevant reporting requirements, which may
vary depending on the jurisdiction. An attorney must not only know the
301. GOV’T § 305.028.
302. Id. § 305.028(b).
303. Id. § 305.028(c)(1)–(3).
304. Id. § 305.028(c-1).
305. Id. § 305.028(c-1)(2).
306. Id. § 305.028(d).
307. Id. § 305.028(f)–(h).
308. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.10(b) (West Supp. 2012) (noting the inapplicability of
offense statutes for gifts to public servants where reporting requirements are met).
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local reporting requirements, but also the reporting requirements of the
local official who is the recipient of the goodwill.
It is evident the activity reports required by each municipality discussed
herein mandate the report of any expenditures made in the course of
lobbying, including expenditures for food, lodging, transportation, and
entertainment.309 However, to avoid implicating the state law’s gift
prohibitions for such expenditures, the local official must also report those
benefits as required by any local ordinance.310
This means, to enjoy the protection conferred by section 36.10 of the
Penal Code, an advocate must first ensure he is meeting the local reporting
requirements. For example, in Dallas and San Antonio, the definition of
“gift” is broad enough to include food, lodging, transportation, and
entertainment.311 A local lobbyist in Dallas must report gifts, benefits, or
expenditures with a cumulative value of over $25 and must specify the
date, cost, and circumstances of the transaction.312 In San Antonio,
quarterly activity reports must include “[e]ach gift, benefit, or expenditure
greater than [$50].”313 In Houston, a lobbyist must report any gift,
expenditure, or honorarium over $250.314 The City of Austin requires its
lobbyists to report expenditures, gifts, or honoraria of $100 or more made
to benefit a city official, along with the “date, beneficiary, amount[,] and
circumstances of the transaction.”315 In El Paso, lobbyists must include
gifts, including meals and entertainment costs, in quarterly reports.316
While it is imperative that attorneys be familiar with the local lobby
309. See, e.g., SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-66
(2012) (requiring quarterly activity reports for lobbying activities, which shall include gifts, benefits,
or expenditures).
310. See, e.g., DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. I, § 12A-15.6 (2012) (providing
guidelines for required disclosures by lobbyists in form, manner, and substance).
311. See SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-42 (2012)
(defining gift as “a voluntary transfer of property (including the payment of money) or the conferral
of a benefit having pecuniary value (such as the rendition of services or the forbearance of collection
on a debt), unless consideration of equal or greater value is received by the donor”); see also DALL.,
TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. I, § 12A-2(21) (2012) (specifying a gift is “a voluntary transfer of
property (including the payment of money) or the conferral of a benefit having pecuniary value”).
312. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III, § 12A-15.6(a) (2012) (mandating “each
registrant [lobbyist] shall file with the city secretary a report concerning the registrant’s lobbying
activities for each client from whom, or with respect to whom, the registrant received compensation
of, or expended, monies for”).
313. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. V, § 2-66(a)(6) (2012).
314. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-75(a)(3) (2012).
315. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 4, ch. 4-8, § 4-8-7(3) (2012).
316. See EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.94, § 2.94.070(A)(7) (2012) (stating all gifts
“must be reported pursuant to Section 2.92.070(B),” which delineates in greater detail what gifts are
reportable).

FISCHER_FINAL

82

6/3/2013 10:54 AM

ST. MARY’S JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACTICE & ETHICS

[Vol. 3:32

disclosure requirements, it is not sufficient to know only the local
disclosure requirements; an attorney must be well versed in the city’s
corresponding code of ethics applicable to its various public officers. The
City of Dallas Code of Ethics has specific reporting requirements related to
travel.317 A Dallas city official must file a disclosure statement after
accepting any trip or excursion in connection with that person’s official
duties, and the disclosure must include “the gratuitous provision of
transportation,
accommodations,
entertainment,
meals,
or
refreshments.”318 The disclosure must also include the sponsor name, the
person funding the trip, the place to be visited, the date of the trip, and the
purpose of the travel.319 If time permits, such disclosure must be made
prior to the excursion; otherwise, it must be reported within seven days
after the travel is concluded.320
In San Antonio, city officials may not accept any gift from a registered
lobbyist, except for meals of less than $50 per occurrence, so long as the
city official does not accept more than $500 in a calendar year from a
single source.321 San Antonio also requires a city official’s financial
disclosure report include the name of each person giving the city official or
the official’s spouse a gift with a fair market value of $100 or more.322 In
Houston, the financial disclosures required of city officials include the
identification of any person or business that donates a gift worth more
than $250, but it specifically excludes food and beverages from the
reporting requirement.323
In the City of Austin, the mayor and council members are required to
make multiple disclosures when they accept any trip or excursion from a
person or entity other than the city.324 Before embarking on a trip or
excursion, the elected official must notify the city clerk of the sponsor’s
name and the place visited, as well as the date, purpose, and duration of
the trip.325 Upon returning, the official must report the approximate
317. See DALL., TEX., CITY CODE ch. 12A, art. III-A, § 12A-21 (2012) (detailing a number of
travel reporting requirements that must be followed by certain persons).
318. Id. § 12A-21(a).
319. Id. § 12A-21(a)(1)–(4).
320. Id.§ 12A-21(a).
321. SAN ANTONIO, TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 2, art. III, div. II, § 2-45(a)(2) (2012).
322. Id. div. VII, § 2-74(14).
323. HOUS., TEX., CODE OF ORDINANCES ch. 18, art. V, § 18-21(g)(6) (2012).
Interestingly, this places the burden upon city officials to determine the value of a benefit for which
they did not pay. There is no guidance for city officials as to whether they must verify the value of
such a benefit, or which valuation method (fair market, face value, etc.) should be utilized.
324. AUSTIN, TEX., CITY CODE tit. 2, ch. 2-7, § 2-7-72(F) (2012).
325. Id.
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value of the trip.326 Thus, to avail oneself of the “food, lodging,
transportation” defense, Austin advocates and officials must ensure the trip
has been reported on the lobbyist’s quarterly activity report and twice by
the elected official.327
El Paso has the most specific reporting provision, requiring city officials
to report “[a]ny hosting, such as travel and expenses, entertainment, meals
or refreshments, that has a value of more than [$50], other than hosting
provided on account of kinship or a personal, professional, or business
relationship independent of the official status of the recipient.”328 The El
Paso city ordinance goes on to require reporting of “[a]ny tickets or other
admission passes to any event with an actual or face value of more than
[$10] . . . except for tickets or admission passes provided by the City for an
event that is sponsored or conducted by the City.”329
What remains unclear is how each of the aforementioned local limits on
gifts will be reconciled with section 36.10(6) of the Texas Penal Code.330
The Penal Code exception to the gift prohibitions authorizes gifts with a
value of less than $50.331 It is not difficult to envision a scenario where a
public official reports the acceptance of a gift prohibited by the Penal Code
in an attempt to comply with a local disclosure requirement.
E. Negative Consequences to Be Considered by the Local Governmental
Practitioner
The attempt to reconcile both state and local lobbying regulations with
an attorney’s ethical obligations is further complicated by provisions found
in the Texas Government Code and the Texas Penal Code. The Penal
Code offers limited deference to transactions reported in accordance with
the state Lobby Law. Nevertheless, the advent of local lobby regulations
serves to complicate rather than simplify the standards imposed by the
Penal Code.
Perhaps the area of greatest risk to the local government lobby
practitioner is the uncertainty surrounding the bribery statute found in
326. Id.
327. See id. § 2-7-72(G) (stating any city official must promptly report to the city manager any
gift or loan accepted); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.10(b) (West Supp. 2012) (outlining the
inapplicability of section 36.08, which may subject a public servant to a penal offense, to “food,
lodging, [and] transportation” that is reported by the done and accepted as a guest).
328. EL PASO, TEX., MUN. CODE tit. 2, ch. 2.92, § 2.92.070(B)(4)(b) (2012).
329. Id. § 2.92.070(B)(4)(d).
330. PENAL § 36.10(a)(6) (West Supp. 2012).
331. Id. (disallowing application of section 36.08 to “an item with a value of less than $50,
excluding cash or a negotiable instrument”).
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section 36.02 of the Texas Penal Code.332 While the exceptions found in
section 36.10333 specifically reference sections 36.08 and 36.09, there is
no application of the language found in section 36.10 to the bribery
provisions in section 36.02.
For discussion purposes, the most relevant portion of section 36.02
reads as follows:
(a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally or knowingly offers,
confers, or agrees to confer on another, or solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept
from another:
(1) any benefit as consideration for the recipient’s decision, opinion,
recommendation, vote, or other exercise of discretion as a public servant,
party official, or voter;
....
(d) It is an exception to the application of Subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of
Subsection (a) that the benefit is a political contribution as defined by Title
15, Election Code, or an expenditure made and reported in accordance with
Chapter 305, Government Code.
(e) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.334

The only exceptions to prosecution for the felony offense of improper
offering of a benefit to a public servant include when the benefit was a
political contribution or was an expenditure made under the Lobby Law,
Chapter 305 of the Government Code.335 Because the Lobby Law does
not apply to local government public servants, there is no exception for
such benefits.336 The offense is complete with the singular act of offering
or soliciting any benefit as consideration; thus, there is no acceptance or
quid pro quo required.337 The practical outcome is that at the state level,
a registrant may make expenditures without being subject to the provision
as long as the registrant reports the expenditure. At the local level,
however, there is no safe harbor, and the local district attorney may
prosecute the violation. The cautious practitioner would be well advised to
counsel clients to be very careful when determining whether to make any
332. PENAL § 36.02 (West 2011).
333. Id. § 36.10 (West Supp. 2012).
334. Id. § 36.02 (West 2011).
335. Id. § 36.02(d).
336. See Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 427, at 2 (2000) (stating Lobby Law restrictions and
exceptions only apply to officers or employees “of the legislative or executive branch of state
government”).
337. See, e.g., Hubbard v. State, 668 S.W.2d 419, 420–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1984) (“The
offense focuses on the mental state of the actor, and is complete if a private citizen, by offering,
conferring, or agreeing to confer, or a public servant or party official, by soliciting, accepting, or
agreeing to accept, intends an agreement.” (citing Minter v. State, 159 S.W. 286 (Tex. Crim. App.
1913))), pet. granted, remanded on other grounds, 739 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
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expenditure involving a local public official or government employee.
There are other areas of incongruity found in state law impacting
advocacy practitioners at the local level. This is primarily seen in statutes
adopted to provide exceptions to state officials and employees, but which
were not extended to local officials.
For example, section 572.060 of the Texas Government Code provides
that a state officer or employee may solicit a contribution to a charity or
government entity without running the risk of that becoming a benefit
under the Penal Code honorarium or gift provisions, Lobby Law, or the
Title 15 campaign law.338 The same protection could have been codified
for local officials and employees but it was not; as a result, these persons
were left subject to the interpretation of the commission that the
contribution as solicited could become an impermissible benefit under the
Penal Code.339
VI. IN CONCLUSION
In a world of increasing transparency and scrutiny on the public
policymaking process, there is likely to be an increasing number of
jurisdictions that will adopt local lobby regulations. Currently, there is no
model ordinance; as a result, the local practitioner will not only have to
monitor any changes at the state level that might influence local
governmental lobby practices, but also all municipalities as well.
Furthermore, in 2013, the Texas Legislature will consider statutory
changes to the jurisdiction of the Texas Ethics Commission, including
Chapter 305 of the Government Code.340 Due to the rules of
professional conduct and the increasing efforts for greater transparency and
disclosure, the lawyer–lobbyist will face significant challenges in ethically
and proficiently representing clients. The attorney who chooses to serve as
both a legal advocate and a policymaking advocate will be subjected to
competing layers of regulatory oversight, including the Texas Disciplinary
Rules of Professional Conduct, state or local lobby restrictions, and the
provisions of the Texas Penal Code. Each of these standards has its own
restrictions, exceptions, interpretive guidance, and potential consequences.
Recognizing and reconciling these normative and legal standards will be
paramount for the ethical attorney.

338. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN., tit. 5, subtit. B, § 572.060 (West 2012).
339. Tex. Ethics Comm’n Op. No. 427, at 1 (2000).
340. Report of the Texas Sunset Advisory Comm. on the Texas Ethics Comm’n, at 1, 26
(2012).

